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Punishment and Juvenile Justice:
A Conceptual Framework for




In his dissenting opinion in In re Gault,1 Justice Stewart ar-
ticulated the traditionally accepted distinction between the juve-
nile justice system and the criminal justice system as follows: "[A]
juvenile proceeding's whole purpose and mission is the very oppo-
site of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal
court. The object of the one is correction of a condition. The object
of the other is conviction and punishment for a criminal act."12 Ju-
venile justice descends from the therapeutic tradition. Thus, the
interventions of the juvenile system into outhful lives supposedly
represent benign parens patriae attempts to cure undesirable or
unhealthy states of being. Unlike the criminal law, juvenile justice
responds to the status of children in need, treating them for what
they are rather than punishing them for what they have done.3
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. B.S., 1969, J.D., 1972, Uni-
versity of Utah.
1. 387 U.S. 1, 78 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 78-79; see also United States ex rel. Stinnett v. Hegstrom, 178 F. Supp. 17, 18
(D. Conn. 1959); White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647, 650 (D.D.C. 1954); State ex rel. Londer-
holm v. Owens, 197 Kan. 212, 223, 416 P.2d 259, 269 (1966) ("[t]he validity of the whole
juvenile system is dependent upon its adherence to its protective, rather than its penal,
aspects"); In re Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 377, 216 A.2d 266, 269 (1966).
3. For a discussion of some of the philosophical consequences of therapeutic versus
punitive models of dealing with social deviancy, see generally Lewis, The Humanitarian
Theory of Punishment, 6 Rzs JuDicATAz 224 (1952-54); Morris, Persons and Punishment, in
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Apart from its obvious importance in shaping decisions and
actions of policymakers, Justice Stewart's punishment/therapy dis-
tinction' also carries important legal consequences. Punished per-
sons are entitled to certain rights, both procedural 5 and substan-
tive,6 which are not necessarily available to persons receiving
nonpunitive dispositions.7
The therapeutic model, however, probably never provided a
totally accurate description of juvenile justice.8 In any event, by
PILosoPHY OF LAw 572 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds. 1975).
4. Whether to abandon systems of punishment in favor of therapeutic models was not
only an issue of fundamental significance in the evolution of juvenile justice legislation, see,
e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-30; Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context
of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167, 169-71, but also a lively subject of debate among
scholars concerned with how best to control undesirable adult conduct. Compare M. MN-
NINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1966) and B. WOOTON, CRTi AND THE CRIMINAL LAw
(1963) with A. VON HSCH, DOING JusTIca: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976) and J.
WILSON, THINKING ABoUT CRIME (1975).
5. Criminal defendants are afforded special procedural protections under the United
States Constitution such as the right to counsel and the right to jury trials. U.S. CONST.
amends. V and VI. The United States Supreme Court traditionally has employed the con-
cept of punishment as the relevant criterion for determining when procedures are "crimi-
nal." G. FLETcHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 409 (1978); see infra notes 76-80 and accom-
panying text.
6. The presence of punishment is a necessary predicate for relief under the bill of
attainder and ex post facto clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. See United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437, 445, 447, 456-57 (1965); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319
(1866); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
386, 390 (1798); L. TRINE, AimucAN CONsTrrUoNAL LAw 477-82 (1978). For a more de-
tailed discussion of Brown, see infra notes 104-12 and accompanying text. For a more de-
tailed discussion of Cummings, see infra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
Punishment is of course a necessary prerequisite for a finding of cruel and unusual
punishment. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII. In applying the eighth amendment, the Supreme
Court has struggled with the problem of determining whether a given sanction constitutes
punishment. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94-99 (plurality opinion), 124-25 (dissent-
ing opinion) (1958). For a more detailed discussion of Trop, see infra notes 65-73 and ac-
companying text.
The Court recently has articulated a due process right to be free from punishment prior
to conviction or plea. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). For a more detailed discussion of
Wolfish, see infra notes 114-43.
Courts distinguish foreign penal laws, imposing punishment, from nonpenal laws and
refuse to enforce the former. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); Kutner, Judi-
cial Identification of "Penal Laws" in the Conflict of Laws, 31 OKLA. L. Rav. 590 (1978).
7. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (civil commitment proceed-
ings not "punitive" in purpose, hence, they are not "criminal prosecutions," and, therefore,
reasonable doubt standard of proof need not be applied); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,
612-620 (1960) (summary termination of social security benefits for deported aliens not pun-
ishment, therefore, no violation of the sixth amendment, the ex post facto clause, or the bill
of attainder clause). For a comprehensive discussion of a variety of the legal consequences of
the punitive/nonpunitive distinction, see generally Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and
Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. Rav. 379 (1976).
8. See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. Rzv.
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the time that Gault was decided, a majority of the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged that juvenile law could not be con-
ceptualized entirely in terms of rehabilitative considerations.' In-
deed, although Justice Stewart saw no constitutional need to
criminalize the nonpunitive juvenile system by requiring the sys-
tem to provide the same procedural protections to juveniles as the
criminal law provides to criminal defendants, 0 the Gault majority
held that the actual dispositions of juvenile delinquents often have
little, if anything, to do with therapy.11 The majority further held
that these dispositions constitute such severe restrictions of liberty
that many of the procedural protections required in criminal trials
also are necessary in delinquency adjudications.1 2 Gault, however,
does not stand for the proposition that juvenile justice schemes are
systematically nontherapeutic. Indeed, the Court in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania13 later denied juveniles the right to jury trials in de-
linquency proceedings, in part on the theory that the presence of
juries might interfere with the rehabilitative goal of the juvenile
system.14 Thus, McKeiver specifically recognizes the therapeutic
potential of juvenile court dispositions.
The Supreme Court cases suggest that juvenile justice systems
are often hybrids, sometimes punitive-or so like punitive models
to require procedural protections unique to the criminal
law-sometimes therapeutic, and often both punitive and thera-
peutic. As a consequence, courts that have addressed the constitu-
tionality of the juvenile justice system since Gault have done so
with the understanding that the system reflects a mixture of theo-
retical underpinnings. Not surprisingly, the courts have had diffi-
culty defining the constitutional rights of juveniles' 5 who are thrust
into a system that is simultaneously punitive and therapeutic.1 6
1187, 1193-1230 (1970).
9. For a discussion of Gault, see infra notes 178-205 and accompanying text.
10. 387 U.S. at 78-79 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
11. The Gault Court did not discuss directly the concept of punishment in its analysis.
The opinion, however, seems to imply that juvenile dispositions are tantamount to punish-
ment for purposes of certain constitutional provisions. See infra notes 189-93 and accompa-
nying text.
12. See infra notes 178-216 & 229-40 and accompanying text.
13. 403 U.S. 523 (1970); see infra notes 217-28 and accompanying text.
14. 403 U.S. at 541-51. For a discussion of the perceived virtues of informal proceed-
ings in general in furthering the therapeutic aims of the juvenile courts, see Paulsen, supra
note 4, at 170-72.
15. See, e.g., infra notes 241-63 and accompanying text.
16. Punishment and therapy often seem to be mutually exclusive goals because of the
backward-looking nature of punishment as contrasted with forward-looking emphasis of
793
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The difficult task facing the courts ultimately is assessing the
extent to which the juvenile system is punitive in nature.17 Because
the concept of punishment includes a discrete set of constitutional
protections,18 Justice Stewart's punishment/therapy distinction, al-
though not utilized explicitly by the Gault majority'°--and per-
haps even misapplied by Justice Stewart himselfP--remains a use-
ful analytical device for developing a coherent constitutional
framework for juvenile law.21 Judicial attention to the concept of
therapy. Punishment imposes unpleasant restraints upon offenders because of their past
offenses, but therapy seeks to alleviate undesirable conditions and thereby improve the pa-
tient's life. For a more detailed explication of punishment and therapy, see infra notes 144-
50 and accompanying text.
17. Commentators describe the problematic state of juvenile justice as follows:
While the Gault opinion purports to give no definition of punishment, it is evident
that the justices were concerned about the confusion which arises over a use of related
terms, such as punishment, treatment, sanction, and the like. Until clarification of ter-
minology can catch up with practical techniques of handling those whose conduct is a
threat to the community, we are likely to continue to have specific cases litigated in
terms of constitutional guarantees. A serious discussion is needed, such as has taken
place among philosophers, on the meaning of punishment in terms of current practice.
There is an appreciable gap between what we traditionally have called punishment and
what we currently use as methods for coercing conformity. The change in public senti-
ment, the progress in science, the advent of a full-fledged police force, all have contrib-
uted to an adaptation of methods of punishment. We can no longer speak of the simple
process of punishing a man by putting him in prison. The least reflection will indicate
that we punish by a wide variety of deprivations, including the trial process itself. Thus
we must attempt to move toward an agreement of what punishment is by way of gen-
eral definition before we can hope to put order into the welter of different applications
of public coercion to the individual in the name of health, education, and general
welfare.
Gerber & McAnany, Punishment: Current Survey of Philosophy and Law, 11 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 491, 520 (1967). See generally In re Felder, 93 Misc. 2d 369, 402 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1978)
(whether New York juvenile statutes impose punishment for purposes of sixth amendment
jury trials); State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1977) (whether con-
finement of status offenders with delinquents in forestry camps constitutes disproportionate
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment). For a detailed discussion of Felder, see
infra notes 256-64 and accompanying text. See generally cases cited infra note 21.
One leading commentator welcomes the movement toward a punitive model of juvenile
justice and suggests that juveniles soon may assert the "right to be punished for what they
have done, not to be treated for what someone else thinks they are." Fox, The Reform of
Juvenile Justice: The Child's Right to Punishment, Juv. JusT., Aug. 1974, at 2, 6; see also
Fox, Philosophy and the Principles of Punishment in the Juvenile Court, 8 FAu. L.Q. 373
(1974). This Article's author extolls the virtues of a "right to be punished" in certain
nonjuvenile situations. See Gardner, The Right to be Punished-A Suggested Constitu-
tional Theory, 33 RuTroSn L. Rzv. 838 (1981).
18. See supra notes 5-7.
19. But see supra note 11.
20. The disposition of Gerald Gault's case may have constituted "punishment" under
the definition employed by the Court at the time that Gault was decided. See infra notes
194-97 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (confine-
794
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punishment and its relationship to juvenile justice will be increas-
ingly necessary in light of recent legislative trends toward punitive
sanctions for certain youthful offenders.2 Moreover, the Supreme
Court, in dicta accompanying its recent holding that eighth
amendment considerations are inapplicable to corporal punish-
ment of public school children,'3 specifically left open the question
whether the eighth amendment's protection against cruel and un-
usual punishment applies to juvenile justice dispositions." The
Court, thus, invited inquiry into whether, and to what extent,
these dispositions constitute punishment.
For punishment to provide a useful framework, courts must
have a clear understanding of the concept of punishment. This un-
derstanding is difficult, however, since punishment, in addition to
being a legal term of art, is also a moral notion characterizing an
area of responsible human activity not definable in terms of neces-
sary and sufficient conditions.25
In light of the inability of the Supreme Court" and leading
philosophical writers' 7 to articulate a precise definition of punish-
ment without full panoply of due process safeguards unconstitutional if done for "punitive"
purposes, constitutionally permissible if serving "beneficent" purposes); Pena v. New York
Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("ft]he court ... finds itself in the
very difficult position of evaluating the punitive and therapeutic components of defendants'
practices"); In re Felder, 93 Misc. 2d 369, 377, 402 N.Y.S.2d 528, 533 (Fan. Ct. 1978) (citing
Justice Stewart's punishment/therapy distinction as analytical tool for determining sixth
amendment jury trial rights). For a further discussion of Felder, see infra notes 256-64 and
accompanying text. See also R.R. v. Texas, 448 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969)
(eighth amendment applicable to juvenile confinements only if the confinements are puni-
tive rather than therapeutic), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 808 (1970).
22. See, e.g., State v. J.K., 383 A.2d 283 (Del. 1977); In re Felder, 93 Misc. 2d 369, 402
N.Y.S.2d 528 (Fam. Ct. 1978).
23. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
24. Id. at 669 n.37 (dictum). The Court stated,
Some punishments, though not labeled "criminal" by the State, may be sufficiently
analogous to criminal punishments in the circumstances in which they are adminis-
tered to justify application of the Eighth Amendment. ... We have no occasion in this
case, for example, to consider whether or under what circumstances persons involunta-
rily confined in ... juvenile institutions can claim the protection of the Eighth
Amendment.
25. See J. KLrmNG, PUNISHMENT AND DEsERT 15 (1973).
26. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's failure to distinguish clearly punish-
ment from regulation. See infra note 33.
27. Perhaps the most widely accepted chacterization of legal punishment within the
philosophical literature is that of H.L.A. Hart-
(i) [Punishment] must involve pain or other consequences normally considered
unpleasant.
(ii) It must be for an offense against legal rules.
(iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence.
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender.
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ment, the difficulty encountered by lower courts that have at-
tempted to delimit the constitutional protections available to
juveniles is understandable. In general, these courts have tended to
adopt one of two approaches: either courts assume, without at-
tempting to provide definitions, that punishment is or is not mani-
fested by the facts of the particular case,28 or they seek a definition
of punishment by relying solely on the Supreme Court's juvenile
cases.29 Both of these approaches are unsatisfactory-the first be-
cause it begs a crucially important question, and the second be-
cause it relies upon cases that do not utilize or define explicitly the
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system
against which the offence is committed.
H. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUISHMNT AND REsPONSmIL-
rY 4-5 (1968). Hart borrows from Anthony Flew and S.I. Benn in formulating his definition.
Id. at 4.
A variety of commentators would add to Hart's list of punishment characteristics. See,
e.g., J. FEmIERO, The Excessive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DEsERvING 95, 98
(1970) (punishment by definition expresses social disapprobation); J. HALL, GENER PRm-
CILES oF CmmiNAL LAw 310, 318 (2d ed. 1960) (punishment is logically related to harmful
conduct and moral culpability).
Other critics focus on internal inconsistencies within Hart's definition. See, e.g., Was-
serstrom, Some Problems with Theories of Punishment, in JusTIcE AND PUNxSHMENT 173,
176 (J. Cederblom & W. Blizek eds. 1977) (Hart's theory tends toward circularity. Clearly,
not all "inflictions of unpleasant consequences for offenses against legal rules" constitute
punishment, e.g., tort liability for negligence per se, based on violation of a statutory norm.
Only "criminal offenses" seem to generate punishment. Hart, however, provides no basis for
distinguishing criminal and noncriminal offenses, apart from the circular path of appealing
to the concept of punishment.
28. For example, many courts equate confinement of juveniles in jail-like facilities
with punishment. See, e.g., Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347, 1352-53 (6th Cir. 1974) (five days
confinement of youth with general jail population prior to initial hearing on a charge of
curfew violation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Inmates of Boys' Training
School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1366 (DRL 1972) ("[t]he reality of confinement in
Annex B is that it is punishment"); In re Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 378, 216 A.2d 266, 269 (1966)
("[c]onfinement in a penal institution will convert the proceedings from juvenile to criminal
and require the observance of constitutional criminal safeguards").
The Supreme Court has held, however, that all jail confinements are not punitive. See,
e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (pretrial detention of persons accused of crime is
not punishment due to an absence of punitive intent); Shillitanti v. United States, 384 U.S.
364, 370 (1966) (jailing for civil contempt is remedial rather than punitive). For a more
detailed discussion of Wolfish, see infra notes 113-43 and accompanying text.
Other courts, without attempting to define punishment or distinguish it from therapy,
have found punishment in the administration of potentially dangerous or painful drugs to
juveniles confined in state facilities. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 357 (7th Cir.),
cert." denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). For a more detailed discussion of Nelson, see infra notes
307-24 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., R.R. v. Texas, 448 S.W.2d 187, 189-90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (punishment
implicitly defined in terms of the "dismal picture" of the conditions within juvenile institu-
tions painted in Gault), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 808 (1970).
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concept of punishment."0
This Article attempts to provide an analytical framework for
identifying the punitive aspects of the juvenile justice system. The
Article proposes a framework that is extrapolated from Supreme
Court cases which define punishment in contexts outside the juve-
nile area. Several commentators have criticized the Court's defini-
tional efforts, some because of perceived inadequacies in the devel-
oped definitions,31 others because of the belief that the very
enterprise of defining constitutional rights in terms of the presence
or absence of punishment is misguided .3 Although many of these
criticisms of the Court's record are understandable, 3 the alleged
defects are less detrimental to an effective analysis of certain juve-
nile rights cases than they might be in other areas. Indeed, this
Article argues that the Court's definitional framework is especially
useful in the juvenile justice context.
II. THE CONCM OF PUNISHMENT: NONJUVENILE SUPREME COURT
CASES
For more than a century, the United States Supreme Court
has attempted to provide a workable definition of punishment."
The Court has addressed a number of cases. Each case has turned
on whether a litigant has been, or is being, punished. Punishment
is a necessary predicate for relief under the bill of attainder and ex
post facto law clauses,3 5 and under the eighth amendment ban on
cruel and unusual punishment .3  The fifth and sixth amendment
protections granted to persons charged with criminal offenses dur-
ing criminal prosecutions are contingent upon a showing that the
30. See infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text. For a leading commentator's view
that Gault offers a definition of punishment, see G. FLErCHmR, supra note 5, at 409-14.
31. See generally Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants
in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478 (1974); Note, Toward a Constitutional Defi-
nition of Punishment, 80 COLum. L. Rzv. 1667 (1980).
32. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 563-64 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Comment, The Availability of Criminal Jury Trials Under the Sixth Amendment, 32 U.
CHi. L. REv. 311, 327-30 (1965).
33. The Court's attempt to distinguish criminal punishment from civil regulation has
been especially disappointing. See Charney, supra note 31, at 491-506; Clark, supra note 7,
at 475-89.
34. The struggle began in earnest with Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 WalL) 277
(1866) and its companion case, Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333- (1866). For a more
detailed discussion of Cummings, see infra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.




sanction for the offense constitutes punishment.37 Moreover, the
Court has stated recently that governmentally imposed punish-
ment prior to conviction or plea violates an accused's due process
rights.38 Inaddition, the Court has suggested that a person may be




A. A Preliminary Concept of Punishment
The Court first attempted to define punishment in the mid-
nineteenth century cases arising under the Constitution's proscrip-
tions against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.40 In Cum-
mings v. Missouri1 the Court struck down as violative of the bill
of attainder and ex post facto law clauses a provision of the Mis-
souri Constitution that required teachers and priests to take an
oath of noninvolvement and nonsympathy with "armed hostility to
the United States.' 42 The provision, a post-Civil War amendment,
also required the affiant to pledge that he had never been in the
service of the Confederate States of America nor "desir[ed] their
triumph over the arms of the United States."'8 Cummings contin-
ued to perform his duties as a teacher and priest without taking
the oath. He was convicted, fined $500, and sentenced to jail until
the fine was paid. Noting that Cummings was punished "for a past
act which was not punishable at the time it was committed," the
Court stated that the oath requirement bore no rational relation-
ship to the legitimate state interest in regulating Cummings'
fitness as an educator45 or to his qualifications as a religious minis-
ter.4" The Court found the measure to be a punitive restraint 7
37. See supra note 5.
38. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); see infra notes 11341 and accompanying text.
39. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-68 (1962) (state may require drug addict
to undergo compulsory treatment, but may not punish him for the status of drug addiction).
40. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3.
41. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
42. Id. at 279.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 319.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. The Court specifically rejected as too narrow the State's argument that the con-
cept of punishment is limited to deprivations of legal rights, specifically restraints on "life,
liberty, or property." Id. at 320, 322. In addition to denials of legal entitlements, punish-
ment also may result through denials of a variety of moral and political rights not specifi-
cally embodied in positive law. Thus, interference with such interests as the "freedom from
outrage on the feelings" or hindrance of one's "pursuit of happiness" may trigger a finding
of punishment. Id. at 320-22. Under this view, any unpleasant restraint-such as interfer-
798 [Vol. 35:791
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upon persons who had been sympathetic to the Confederacy.48 Al-
though this amendment did not refer specifically to crime or pun-
ishment,4 ' the purpose clearly was punitive.8 0 The enforcement of
the amendment constituted punishment not only because the state
subjected Cummings to unpleasant restraints for his failure to take
the oath, but also because the sole purpose of the restraints was to
mete out deserts for perceived wrongful acts committed in the
past. 1 Because the wrongful acts-sympathizing with the Confed-
eracy-were not crimes in Missouri at the time that Cummings
might have committed them, the state could not constitutionally
punish him for their commission.2
Although some theorists have argued that punishment in its
legal context "must [necessarily] be for an offence against legal
rules,"58 Cummings demonstrates that the relationship between
punishment and legal rules is not a logical one. Although punish-
ment may exist independent of legal rules, the principle of legal-
ity," as reflected in such constitutional provisions as the ex post
facto law and bill of attainder clauses, justifies the imposition of
punishment only when legal rules articulate the conduct and the
degree of punishment for its commission prior to the occurrence of
the offense."s Thus, Cummings establishes that punishment is the
intentional imposition by the state of unpleasant restraints" upon
offenders solely because of past wrongful acts. The Court's concep-
tion of punishment turns heavily on an examination of legislative
ence with happiness or well-being--can constitute punishment. Thus, the views of a recent
commentator, who would link the notion of punishment to "deprivations of legal rights,"
should be rejected. Note, supra note 31, at 1680-81.
48. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320, 327. The Court found that the oath "reach[ed] the person,
not the calling." Id. at 320.
49. See id. at 279-81.
50. The Court focused on the notion of punitive motivation as a necessary element of
its finding of punishment. Punishment is determined by the "causes of deprivation." Id. at
320.
51. Id. at 320, 327.
52. The Court found the Missouri constitutional clauses violative of both the bill of
attainder clause, id. at 323-25, and ex post facto clause, id. at 327-28.
53. H. HART, supra note 27, at 5.
54. The principle of legality may be expressed in a variety of ways: no person may be
punished except pursuant to a statute which prescribes a penalty;, no conduct may be crimi-
nal unless it is precisely defined by a rule; no penal statute may be given retroactive effect.
The principle is a limitation on the power of the state to punish. The definition of punish-
ment, therefore, does not include the principle of legality. See J. HALL, supra note 27, at 27-
28.
55. Id.
56. See supra note 47.
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purpose, derived in Cummings from an independent judicial in-
quiry into the possible functions of the oath-taking provision, with
virtually no deference to legislative history or characterizations.
B. Punishment v. Regulation
Dicta in Cummings suggest that the Supreme Court might
have concluded that the Missouri amendment was a permissible
state regulation, rather than punishment, if the oath requirement
had been less retributive.57 Thus, if the state had offered a for-
ward-looking sanction that was rationally related to effectuating
genuine state policy goals, then the Court may have sustained the
Missouri amendment. 8 The Court intimated that punishment is
conceptually distinct from sanctions whose sole purpose is to shape
future states of affairs. Indeed, shortly after Cummings the Court,
in Dent v. West Virginia" and Hawker v. New York, 60 sustained
statutes that altered the requirements for practicing medicine in
West Virginia and New York. These provisions denied continued
practice to those physicians who failed to meet the new statutory
requirements. 1 In both Dent and Hawker the Court rejected
claims by the physicians that the statutes inflicted unconstitu-
tional punishment under the bill of attainder and ex post facto law
clauses. The Court found the statutes to be reasonable regulations
of the medical profession under the state police power. Unlike the
situation in Cummings, the statutes in Dent and Hawker reflected
no attempt by the legislature to impose restraints upon the claim-
ants because of their past wrongful actions.2 Thus, regulation may
be distinguished from punishment in that regulation controls fu-
ture conduct for general purposes" without any attention necessa-
57. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320 (dictum).
58. Id.
59. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
60. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
61. In Dent the Court unanimously upheld a West Virginia statute requiring doctors
either to have graduated from medical school or to have passed a special examination as a
valid exercise of state police power. In Hawker the Court upheld the retroactive application
of a New York statute that prohibited convicted felons from practicing medicine.
62. Although the statute in Hawker affected persons who had been convicted of
crimes, the Court stated that the state was "not seeking to further punish a criminal, but
only to protect its citizens from physicians of bad character." 170 U.S. at 196. While the
Court granted that not all convicted criminals possess bad character, the state "has power in
cases of this kind to make a rule of universal application, and no inquiry is permissible back
of the rule to ascertain whether the fact of which the rule is made the absolute test does or
does not exist." Id. at 197.
63. Such a distinction in punishments and regulations is consistent with H. PACKIM,
800 [Vol. 35:791
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rily directed to one's past actions. Punishment, on the other hand,
is always backward-looking in the sense that it is imposed because
of some past action.
If, however, Cummings and Dent/Hawker represent cases of
pure punishment and pure regulation, then the state's imposition
of sanctions often will reflect attempts both to impose restraints
upon offenders because of past actions and to shape future conduct
for general purposes. Courts, therefore, encounter great difficulty
when attempting to draw bright-line distinctions between punish-
ments and regulations."
The Cummings definition of punishment lay virtually unal-
tered for almost 100 years" until the Supreme Court's 1958 deci-
sion in Trop v. Dulles" that addressed the problem whether dena-
tionalization of persons convicted by court-martial for wartime
desertion constituted punishment under the eighth amendment.
The Government argued that the sanction was not punitive, but
rather was a regulatory exercise under the congressional war power
that was necessary to maintain military discipline." The Court re-
jected the Government's argument and found that the sanction
was not only punitive,'8 but also cruel and unusual punishment in
THE Limrrs OF TE CRIMINAL SANCTION 23-26 (1968).
64. See H. PACKER, supra note 63, at 21-31; Charney, supra note 31, at 491-506; Clark,
supra note 7, at 475-89; infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
65. This is not to say, however, that the Court did not have occasion to consider the
problem of determining when sanctions are punitive. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522,
531 (1954) (although deportation is "close to punishment," ex post facto clause inapplica-
ble); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313-18 (1946) (statutory denial of salary or other
compensation to certain named governmental employees constitutes punishment without ju-
dicial trial in violation of the bill of attainder clause); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,
398-99 (1938) (tax assessment of 50% of total amount of fraudulently deficient taxes is not
punishment barred by double jeopardy clause when defendant was acquitted previously of
criminal fraud); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1922) (taxes upon trafficking in
illegal liquor are in reality punishments which cannot be enforced by incarceration without
hearing); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-35 (1886) (forfeiture proceedings under
customs laws are criminal for purposes of fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination).
66. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
67. Although the Trop Court was sharply divided, four Justices in the plurality and
four in dissent suggested that the definition of punishment should be analyzed separate
from and prior to the issue of cruelty under the eighth amendment. Four Justices found
punishment under the eighth amendment. Id. at 94-100, 124. The ninth Justice, Justice
Brennan, did not utilize the eighth amendment in his analysis of the problem in Trop, but
relied instead upon a theory of congressional abuse of the war power. Brennan agreed with
the plurality that denationalization was punitive and found that it constituted an unneces-
sarily harsh exercise of Congress' war power. Id. at 105-14.
68. Id. at 94-95.
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violation of the eighth amendment.6 The Court relied primarily
upon the presence of a punitive legislative motivation underlying
the denationalization provision. A plurality of the Court found this
motivation" by applying a more refined test than that articulated
in Cummings: "If the statute imposes a disability for the purposes
of punishment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter
others, etc.-it has been considered penal. But a statute has been
considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to
accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose. 11 Trop,
therefore, suggests that penal purpose is not defined solely in
terms of retributive considerations. A legislature's attempts to
achieve general deterrence also may reveal punitive motivation.
Moreover, the plurality's "etc. '72 implies that punishment is deter-
mined by indicia other than the considerations provided by the
Trop Court.
The Trop plurality offered additional insight into the nature
of punishment by noting that penal laws characteristically define
the consequences which will befall wrongdoers prior to any partic-
ular instance of wrongdoing. "[A] statute that prescribes the conse-
quence that will befall one who fails to abide by [rules governing
the proper performance of military obligations] is a penal law.
'7 3
69. A four Justice plurality found an eighth amendment violation. A fifth Justice con-
curred with the result on other grounds. See supra note 67.
70. See supra note 69.
71. 356 U.S. at 96. The Court found that expatriation constituted punishment. The
plurality rejected claims that the sanction reflected a mere regulation governing the proper
performance of military obligations. "[A] statute that prescribes the consequence that will
befall one who fails to abide by these [obligations] is a penal law." Id. at 97.
The Court, in a companion case to Trop, however, upheld a statutory provision impos-
ing denationalization for the act of voting in a foreign election. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S.
44 (1958). Unlike Trop, the Perez Court found no retributive purpose. The sanction consti-
tuted a purely foward-looking exercise of Congress' power to regulate foreign affairs. Id. at
57-62. The expatriation sanction evidenced a reasonable method of avoiding embarrassing
disputes with foreign nations. "The termination of citizenship terminates the problem." Id.
at 60.
Although the Court did not apply the Trop definition of punishment to the expatriation
sanction in Perez, this analysis yields interesting results. Unlike the situation in Trop, no
attempt was made to "reprimand a wrongdoer" in Perez, because voting in a foreign election
is neither reprehensible nor wrong. While voting in a foreign election may be interpreted as
an act that indicates a lack of allegiance to the United States, American citizens may freely
and without censure disassociate themselves from their country whenever they wish. The
absence of perceived wrongful conduct in Perez eliminates the possibility of punitive moti-
vation. Thus, while expatriation for the offense of desertion constitutes punishment in Trop,
application of the very same sanction for the legally and morally neutral conduct of voting
in a foreign election is nonpunitive in Perez.
72. Trop, 356 U.S. at 96.
73. Id. at 97.
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Thus, unlike sanctions such as compensatory damages, the mea-
sure of punishment in any given case usually is legislatively prede-
termined 4 and is imposed following a showing by the state that
certain proscribed conduct has occurred. Moreover, the state is not
required to show that harm was actually suffered by any particular
victim .7
The Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez 6 again struggled
with the punishment-regulation distinction in ruling that the pro-
cedural protections of the fifth and sixth amendments must be
given to persons who have forfeited their United States citizenship
by fleeing the country to evade the military draft. Unlike Trop, in
which citizenship was forfeited after conviction by court-martial,
the statute in Mendoza-Martinez automatically imposed forfeiture
of citizenship, without prior court or administrative proceedings,
upon any person fleeing the country to evade military service."
The issue in the case hinged on whether the forfeiture constituted
punishment impermissibly imposed in the absence of criminal pro-
cess protections,78 or whether the forfeiture was a form of noncrim-
inal regulation under Congress' war and foreign affairs powers.7 '
Consistent with its decision in Trop, the Court in Mendoza-Marti-
nez found that the forfeiture constituted punishment and, there-
fore, was constitutionally permissible only after a "criminal trial
[with] all its incidents."80 The Court determined that the sanction
was punitive by relying on cases such as Cummings and Trop that
set forth "the tests traditionally applied to determine whether an
74. But see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
75. The aim of the criminal law... is to protect the public against harm, by pun-
ishing harmful results of conduct or at least situations (not yet resulting in actual
harm) which are likely to result in harm if allowed to proceed further. The function of
tort law is to compensate someone who is injured for the harm he has suffered. With
crimes, the state itself brings criminal proceedings to protect the public interest but
not to compensate the victim; with torts, the injured party himself institutes proceed-
ings to recover damages.
W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 11 (1972); see also H. PACKER, supra note 63, at 23-
24.
76. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
77. Id. at 164-66. Although no hearing on the issue of flight to evade the draft was
held, the government uncovered the flight in a variety of ways. See, e.g., id. at 147 (admis-
sion by defendant); id. at 151 (defendant remained outside the United States after being
ordered to report for military induction).
78. Id. at 164. A finding of punishment would require that defendant be afforded fifth
amendment and sixth amendment rights to notice, confrontation, compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses, trial by jury, and assistance of counsel.
79. Id. at 159-60, 164.
80. Id. at 167.
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Act. . . is penal or regulatory."81 The tests according to the Men-
doza-Martinez Court include the following:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether
it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the tradi-
tional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior
to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it ap-
pears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.8 2
In the absence of "conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to
the penal nature of a statute," courts must weigh these considera-
tions in relation to the language of the statute.83 The Court admit-
ted that the listed elements "often point in different directions,""
but offered no method for weighing the various considerations
when they conflict with one another. Moreover, the Mendoza-Mar-
tinez Court did not explain how these criteria would apply to the
forfeiture statute "because the objective manifestations of congres-
sional purpose indicate conclusively that the provisions in question
can only be interpreted as punitive."' 5 Thus, the Court found that
the clear legislative purpose of the statute was to provide an espe-
cially severe penalty, in addition to other penalties imposed for
draft evasion, to a particularly reprehensible category of draft
evaders."'
Two of the Mendoza-Martinez tests for punishment are espe-
cially useful in analyzing possible punishment cases.8 7 The first
81. Id. at 168.
82. Id. at 168-69.
83. Id. at 169.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 169-70, 180-84. The Court found no legislative intent to effectuate af-
firmative social goals through the sanction. Instead, the sanction was imposed only for retri-
bution and for deterrence of draft evasion. For an insightful comment on the Mendoza-
Martinez opinion, see Comment, The Concept of Punitive Legislation and the Sixth
Amendment: A New Look at Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 32 U. CHi. L. Rav. 290 (1965).
87. Most of the Mendoza-Martinez tests add little to existing doctrine. The require-
ment of an "affirmative disability or restraint" seems merely to reflect the Cummings-Trop
view that punishment entails the purposeful imposition of unpleasant restraints. Scrutiny of
the historic characterization of the behavior and sanction in question is also of little utility.
Whether the sanction historically has been regarded as punitive seems simply to rephrase
the punitive motivation question rather than to provide a means for its answer. Similarly,
the very question in many cases is whether the conduct to which a sanction applies is
criminal for fifth and sixth amendment purposes. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144 (1963). The answer to that question depends on whether the sanction is pun-
ishment. Defining punishment by reference to criminality does not answer the question.
Finally, the Court's citation of retribution and deterrence as the traditional aims of punish-
ment adds nothing to the criteria that were articulated in Trop.
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test-whether the sanction is excessive in relation to assigned
nonpunitive purposes-is a particularly promising analytical stan-
dard that will be discussed in detail later in this Article.8 8 The sec-
ond test, which focuses upon scienter as a characteristic precondi-
tion of punishment, deserves only brief attention. Under this
approach, the Court seems to focus upon the nexus between pun-
ishment and blame. Indeed, some theorists have argued that the
power of punishment to express social disapprobation toward mor-
ally blameworthy offenders is the central characteristic that distin-
guishes punishment from nonpunitive sanctions.8' Since, however,
the Court has sustained the validity of strict liability crimes,90
moral blame does not seem to be a necessary characteristic for ei-
ther the definition or the justification of the criminal sanction.
Thus, the scienter test of Mendoza-Martinez is probably no more
than a recognition that findings of personal responsibility often
precede the imposition of punishment.' 1
1. Definition v. Justification
Trop and Mendoza-Martinez indicate a desire by the Court to
incorporate traditional justifications of punishment-such as de-
terrence of undesirable conduct' 2 and the dispensing of deserts to
blameworthy offenders'S-into the definition of punishment. On a
88. See infra notes 123-40 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., J. FEINBERG, supra note 27; Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw
& CoNTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958) ("[w]hat distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction
and all that distinguishes it ... is the judgment of community condemnation which accom-
panies and justifies its imposition").
90. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
91. The relationship, however, between punishment and responsibility does not appear
to be a logical one. Thus, the state could punish knowingly-although probably not justifia-
bly-a person who is not responsible and known not to be responsible for the action for
which he is being punished. See H. HART, supra note 27, at 4-6; J. KLImG, supra note 25,
at 12-13.
92. For a classical statement of deterrence theory, see Bentham, Utility and Punish-
ment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHmENT 56 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972). For a more
modem view of deterrence, see generally J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974).
93. Kant spoke in these terms:
Judicial Punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting an-
other Good either with regard to the Criminal himself or to Civil Society, but must in
all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed
a Crime. For one man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to
the purpose of another, nor be mixed up with the subjects of Real Right. Against such
treatment his Inborn Personality has a Right to protect him, even although he may be
condemned to lose his Civil Personality. He must first be found guilty and punishable,
before there can be any thought of drawing from his Punishment any benefit for him-
self or his fellow-citizens. The Penal Law is a Categorical Imperative; and woe to him
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philosophical level, the blurring of definitional and justificational
issues is undesirable because definitions that emerge exclude from
the range of possible justifications the considerations that are con-
tained within the definition." For example, if punishment is de-
fined as "the purposeful infliction of suffering upon offenders be-
cause of their offense in order to deter others from committing
similar offenses," 95 then one encounters difficulty in utilizing the
deterrence theory to justify punishment. 6 Although the justifica-
tion for punishment is-or at least should be-of vital significance
to theorists and policymakers, 7 it is perhaps of less concern to
courts. Judicial inquiry generally focuses upon whether particular
who creeps through the serpentwindings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage
that may discharge him from the Justice of Punishment, or even from the due measure
of it.
I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie trans. 1887) (1st ed. 1796).
94. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 27, at 95; J. KLEINIG, supra note 25, at 10-13; E.
PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 56 (1966) ("[W]e want to avoid allowing
any part of the justification (or dis-justification) of punishment to creep into its definition,
so that a case for acceptance or rejection or reform can seem to turn on 'the very meaning'
of punishment.").
95. Thomas Hobbes offered a similar definition:
A punishment, is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath done,
or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be a Transgression of the
Law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.
[A]ll evill which is inflicted without intention, or possibility of disposing the
Delinquent, or (by his example) other men, to obey the Lawes, is not Punishment; but
an act of hostility; because without such an end, no hurt done is contained under that
name.
T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN §§ 161-62.
96. See J. KLEINIG, supra note 25, at 11.
Another commentator has argued that the purpose of punishment must be distin-
guished from the justification of punishment.
The purpose of punishment must be distinguished from its justification. A justifi-
cation is a morally acceptable purpose. Thus, it represents a second level of analysis,
beyond mere purpose. As such, it does not define punishment, but rather defines mor-
ally defensible punishment. Mere purpose, on the other hand, is directly relevant to the
broader definitional inquiry, to the extent that punishment may be described as con-
duct engaged in for a certain purpose. It should be noted, however, that in inquiries
involving justification for punishment, punishment is assumed to be already defined.
Where purpose is being examined, the concern is, strictly speaking, with the purpose of
the conduct that has not yet been defined as punishment.
Note, supra note 31, at 1679 n.83.
97. Because punishment is the intentional infliction of suffering upon persons, it is
morally and politically controversial. For some recent examples of the controversy, see gen-
erally AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMrrrEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971); T. HoNDERICH,
PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS (1969); REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); Morris,
supra note 3; Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217 (1973). See also
supra note 4.
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restraints constitute punishment as a matter of constitutional fact
notwithstanding the general desirability of imposing the re-
straint.' If, however, punitive intent is to be a defining character-
istic of punishment, the Court inevitably must appeal to justifica-
tory theories of punishment in fashioning its definition." This
approach is not problematic if only those justifications that are
unique to punishment are included in the definition. Thus, the
Court would have been on firmer ground if it had included in the
definition of punishment only retributive considerations such as
"the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies
[punishment] and justifies its imposition." 100 The Court, however,
also includes considerations of deterrence in the definition. The
deterrence of undesirable states of affairs is certainly not unique to
the criminal sanction.101 Indeed, deterrence is also a central feature
of governmental regulation. Thus, if punitive purpose is defined as
unpleasant restraints imposed to deter undesirable conduct or to
achieve desirable consequences,102 then the concepts of punish-
ment and regulation may be indistinguishable.
°10
2. United States v. Brown: An Aberration
In United States v. Brown1 "4 the Court further blurred the
definition and justification issues. The Court in Brown invoked the
bill of attainder clause to strike down section 504 of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, which prohib-
98. Courts are unlikely to encounter problems with defining punishment in terms of
its traditional justifications, for these justifications-or at least the utilitarian ones--tend to
relate to issues of the justification of punishment in general, which is an issue that seldom
concerns the courts. See H. HART, supra note 27, at 8-12; Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in
THE PHILOSPHY OF PUNISHMrNT 105 (H. Acton ed. 1969). Even the retributive purposes of
punishment may be viewed as nonjudicial issues of general justification. See Gardner, The
Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 781, 797-
99.
Courts, however, do agonize over whether punishment in a given case is justified. See,
e.g., United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Unlike the question of
whether punishment in general is justified, however, judicial problems of justification focus
narrowly on decisions concerning the punishment of particular persons. Often the judicial
problem of justifying punishment is solved once the defendant is found to have violated a
law imposing punishment.
99. See H. PACKER, supra note 63, at 21-23.
100. Hart, supra note 89, at 404.
101. See id. at 403-04.
102. The law often attempts to achieve desirable consequences by penalizing omis-
sions to act. See, e.g., W. LAFAv & A. Scorr, supra note 75, 182-91.
103. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
104. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
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ited past members of the Communist Party from serving in leader-
ship positions of labor organizations.105 Brown, who had been a
member of the Party long before the enactment of the 1959 provi-
sion, was convicted of violating the statute despite the failure of
the Government to show that he advocated or suggested any illegal
or undesirable union activity. The Court rejected the Govern-
ment's argument that section 504 was a nonpunitive regulatory at-
tempt to prevent Communists from gaining positions of union in-
fluence from which they might encourage political strikes.,,
Although the Court found no retributive legislative motivation un-
derlying section 504, the Court, nevertheless, satisfied itself that
the provision constituted punishment. "It would be archaic to limit
the definition of 'punishment' to 'retribution.' Punishment serves
several purposes; retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent-and pre-
ventive. One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of
crimes is to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does
not make imprisonment any the less punishment."10 Because sec-
tion 504 inflicted punishment upon a specified group without a
trial, the Court concluded that the provision clearly constituted a
bill of attainder. 08 The Brown Court, however, did not explain
why defining punishment solely in terms of retributive considera-
tions would be "archaic." Indeed, defining punishment entirely in
backward-looking terms hardly seems archaic. e'0 By contrast, how-
ever, to attempt justifications for punishment, once defined, solely
in retributive terms"10 clearly would be archaic to most modem
minds.
The Brown Court's confusion of the definition and justifica-
tion issues is more than a philosophical mistake. This confusion
frustrates the legally necessary task of distinguishing punishment
from other types of coercive sanctions.""' If one defines punitive
purpose as the imposition of restraints to achieve rehabilitation or
incapacitation, then the definition provides no basis for differenti-
105. Id. at 449.
106. Id. at 439-40, 456-57.
107. Id. at 458.
108. Id. at 456-62.
109. See J. KLiNIG, supra note 25, at 17-22; E. PINcors, supra note 94, at 56-57; cf.
Wasserstrom, supra note 27, at 178-79 (considerations of deterrence are relevant but not
necessary to the definition of punishment).
110. Even the most retributively oriented modern theories of punishment appeal in
some manner to utilitarian considerations for justification. See, e.g., A. VoN HmsCH, supra
note 4, at 47.
111. See infra notes 114-50 and accompanying text.
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ating punishment from therapy or preventive detention. The
Court, however, requires the drawing of just such distinctions.11
C. Punishment v. Preventive Detention
Although some commentators would welcome the characteri-
zation of all coercive therapy and preventive detention as punish-
ment for purposes of the fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments, s
the Supreme Court has not adopted this view. The Court in Bell v.
Wolfish' 4 implicitly turned from the Brown approach and made a
sharp distinction between punishment and preventive detention
for purposes of due process analysis. The Wolfish Court rejected
the argument that the confinement of pretrial detainees violated
the due process clause because it constituted punishment in the
absence of adjudication of guilt.115 The Court found the detainees'
confinement to be nonpunitive and, therefore, consistent with due
process.11 The Court noted, however, that the due process clause
would have been violated if punishment were imposed without a
prior adjudication of guilt. 17 After resorting to the "useful guide-
posts" of Mendoza-Martinez and its emphasis upon punitive moti-
vation, the Court held that since the pretrial confinement reasona-
bly promoted the nonpunitive aim of assuring presence at trial, no
punitive intent existed.118 Rather than punishment, the confine-
ment reflected "a legitimate nonpunitive . . . objective."11' 9 The
112. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 114-50 and accom-
panying text.
113. See, e.g., Coleman & Solomon, Parens Patriae "Treatment": Legal Punishment
in Disguise, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 345 (1976); Opton, Psychiatric Violence Against Pris-
oners: When Therapy is Punishment, 45 Miss. L.J. 605 (1974).
114. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
115. Id. at 535-41. The inmates raised a variety of constitutional challenges to the
conditions and practices at the Metropolitan Correctional Center. These complaints in-
cluded confinement of two inmates in cells built for one, visual genital and anal searches by
jail staff after all "contact" visits with outsiders, unobserved spot searches of cells, prohibi-
tion of the receipt of packages except at Christmas, and bans on hardcover books unless
sent directly from the publisher or a book club.
116. Id. at 541.
117. "[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law." Id. at 535.
118. Id. at 538-41.
119. Id. at 539 n.20. The Court fashioned the following test for punishment: "[I]f a
restriction or condition [of pretrial detention] is not reasonably related to a legitimate
goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the
governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detain-
ees qua detainees." Id. at 539. The Court then expanded its reasoning in a footnote:
[I]n the absence of a showing of intent to punish, a court must look to see if a particu-
lar restriction or condition, which may on its face appear to be punishment, is instead
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Wolfish outcome, however, might have been different if the moti-
vation for confinement had been to effectuate the objectives of ret-
ribution or deterrence-objectives that were viewed by the Court
as "not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives. '120 More-
over, the Court suggested that punitive intent might have been in-
ferred if the liberty restrictions had not been "reasonably related"
to legitimate governmental aims.121 Wolfish, therefore, seems to
have abandoned the use of rehabilitative and preventive detention
guidelines to assess punitive intent. Instead, the Court now appar-
ently discerns punitive intent solely in terms of deterrence and
retribution.
122
Wolfish adds an important gloss to the problem of discovering
punitive intent. In addition to actual and explicit expressions of
intent, courts may infer punitive intent from pretrial restraints on
liberty, or other restrictions which "on their face appear to be pun-
ishment,"123 but are unreasonably harsh in relation to legitimate,
nonpenal objectives.2 Thus, pretrial preventive detention of an
accused is permissible if the confinement is not unduly restrictive
in relation to the nonpenal objective of assuring presence at
trial. 1 25 If, however, the detainee can show that his confinement is
unnecessarily harsh in relation to the state's nonpenal interests,
then the detainee could argue that the conditions of confinement
reflect an intent to punish. In this situation, preventive detention
would become punishment.1
26
but an incident of a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective .... Retribution
and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives.
Id. at 539 n.20 (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 539. For a criticism of Wolfish, see The Supreme Court 1978 Term, 93
HAnv. L. REv. 1, 99-108 (1979).
122. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Marshall criticized the majority's utilization of the
concept of punishment as an "empty semantic exercise." 441 U.S. at 569 n.7. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Rather than invoke the concept of punishment, Justice Marshall advocated the
application of a straight balancing rest that weighed the detainees' liberty interests against
the state's asserted interests. Id. at 569-70. Under this test, the government would be re-
quired to show that a restriction was "substantially necessary" to jail administration in or-
der for it to outweigh the detainees' liberty interest. Id. at 570.
123. See supra note 119.
124. Id.
125. The Court also noted the interest in maintaining security within the jail as a
nonpenal objective requiring restraints on liberty. See 441 U.S. at 539-40.
126. The Court offered the following illustration:
[L]oading a detainee with chains and shackles and throwing him in a dungeon may
ensure his presence at trial and preserve the security of the institution. But it would be
difficult to conceive of a situation where conditions so harsh, employed to achieve
objectives that could be accomplished in so many alternative and less harsh methods,
[Vol. 35:791810
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Judicial scrutiny of the reasonableness of restraints that ap-
pear on their face to be punishment is both laudable and problem-
atic. The use of a rationality standard for assessing punishment
frees the inquiry from a rigid conceptual exegesis and creates pos-
sibilities for analysis enriched by considerations of underlying con-
stitutional values. Unreasonable governmental restraints of liberty
that appear to be punishment trigger the arsenal of constitutional
protections traditionally attending that concept. At the same time
this requirement-that the restraint "appear on its face to be pu-
nitive"-introduces a problem of circularity: What test determines
punitive restraint? The Court's traditional test-whether the legis-
lature enacted the law with a punitive motivation-is inapposite.
Indeed, the Court seeks to infer punitive motivation once it discov-
ers restraints that are punitive on their face and excessively harsh
in relation to nonpunitive aims. In addition, the punitive-on-its-
face rubric could result in an inference of punitive intent in situa-
tions in which the alleged punishers in fact intended no such thing.
The courts may view the test as an abandonment of the inquiry
into subjective punitive intent in favor of a more objective effect
theory of punishment.12 7 The effect theory defines punishment
solely in terms of the impact of an alleged punisher's actions re-
gardless of the punisher's purposes.128 Thus, even if the state could
would not support a conclusion that the purpose for which they were imposed was to
punish. '
Id. at 539 n.20.
127. Justice Stevens has advocated this view:
I believe the Court improperly attaches significance to the subjective motivation of the
defendant as a criterion for determining whether cruel and unusual punishment has
been inflicted. Subjective motivation may well determine what, if any, remedy is appro-
priate against a particular defendant. However, whether the constitutional standard
has been violated should turn on the character of the punishment rather than the moti-
vation of the individual who inflicted it.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Chief Judge Coffin has expressed a similar view: "Itwould be impossible, without play-
ing fast and loose with the English language, for a court to examine the conditions of con-
finement under which detainees are incarcerated .... and conclude that their custody was
not punitive in effect if not in intent." Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 380 (1st Cir. 1978)
(Coffin, C.J., dissenting); see also Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12, 21 (N.D. IM. 1975) ("the
overall effect, the reality of the situation, is that petitioner ... and his family will suffer
severe punishment in relation to the offense unless this Court grants him some form of
relief"), rev'd mem., 529 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1976). See generally Note, A Definition of Pun-
ishment for Implementing the Double Jeopardy Clause's Multiple-Punishment Prohibi-
tion, 90 YMLn L.J. 632 (1981) (intent of a challenged practice is irrelevant in defining
punishment).
128. Thus, if the state subjects an individual to unpleasant restrictions similar to
those restraints experienced by persons who are punished, similar for example to depriva-
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show that it actually intended nonpunitive detention, the confine-
ment would nonetheless be punishment, albeit accidental, if the
effects of detention were perceived by the inmates as punitive and
if the confinement, for whatever reason, was excessive in light of its
nonpenal purposes.12
Although confinement under these circumstances may be un-
constitutional on other grounds,130 the Supreme Court would prob-
ably decline to characterize the confinement as impermissible pre-
trial punishment. The philosophical literature and the Court's
opinions clearly indicate that punishment is an activity concept
that requires purposeful action and not just punitive effect.
13 1
"Punishments do not happen to or befall people. Rather, they are
treatments to be understood within the context of responsible-or
intentional-activity."1 3 2 Accidental punishment, therefore, is logi-
tions existing in prisons, then the sanction is considered to be "punishment" regardless of
the state's purpose in administering it. See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment
of the Mentally Ill, 87 HI- v. L. REv. 1190, 1331 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
129. Suppose, for example, that the state implemented a drug treatment program for
pretrial detainees awaiting trial on drug related charges. Suppose further that the therapy
included a painful treatment regimen that was perceived by the detainees as a form of cor-
poral punishment. Imagine that responsible state authorities genuinely believed that that
form of therapy was the least drastic means of effectively treating drug addiction. Assuming
the existence of a legitimate state interest in treating drug addiction in the context of pre-
trial detention, if the detainees could show that less drastic means were in fact available to
achieve the state's therapeutic interest, the treatment program would, under the effect the-
ory, appear to be punishment, notwithstanding the state's admittedly nonpunitive intent.
130. Doctrinal grounds for the constitutional invalidation of confinement exist under
concepts of due process not necessarily linked to punishment and also under the equal pro-
tection clause. If the state deliberately inflicts "appreciable physical pain," then the confine-
ment may violate the fourteenth amendment due process clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 672-74 (1977). Although Ingraham was a punishment case, the Court's due process
language is not limited necessarily to a punitive context. Indeed, the Court specifically held
the cruel and unusual punishment clause to be inapplicable to the case. Id. at 664; see also
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir.) (brutal treatment of pretrial detainees, al-
though not punishment, is nevertheless unconstitutional under the due process clause), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). The Ingraham Court further stated that "[t]he liberty pre-
served from deprivation without due process [includes] ... a right to be free from, and to
obtain judicial relief for, unjustified instrusions on personal security." 430 U.S. at 673.
A finding that the confinement is nonpunitive would not insulate the detention from
attack under the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp.
128, 138, 142 (N.D. Cal. 1972) ("[w]hether onerous prison conditions are imposed on pre-
trial detainees under the shibboleth of 'punishment' or 'security,' the constitutionality of
those conditions is always a proper subject of judicial inquiry" under the equal protection
clause); see also Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention,
79 YALE L.J. 941, 947-50 (1970) (to classify detainees with convicts for purposes of deter-
mining conditions is unreasonable).
131. See J. KLEINIG, supra note 25, at 17-22.
132. Id. at 17. The recognition of intentional activity as a necessary aspect of the con-
cept of punishment does not require "an intentional activity engaged in for the purpose of
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cally impossible.183 Thus, the Court probably would reject any
reading of Wolfish that found punishment in cases in which al-
leged punishers genuinely intended nonpunitive treatment. Indeed,
an effect theory interpretation of Wolfish would commit the Court
to a metaphorical conception of punishment 3 ' that would threaten
to engulf virtually all legal sanctions within its definition." 5
A more modest and plausible reading of Wolfish would save
the Court from the effect theory and permit findings of punish-
ment through the punitive-on-its-face criterion only when circum-
stances justify the conclusion that punitive intent actually exists.
In cases of sanctions that suspiciously resemble punishment, a
court would scrutinize the rationale underlying the sanctions. If
the sanctions were unreasonably excessive in relation to articulated
nonpunitive purposes, then a court would justifiably infer that the
sanction reflected an actual intent to punish. The use of objective
rationality standards to infer a subjective state of mind is not new
to the law.188 A problem arises, however, when determining which
punishing." Indeed, the Court has recognized "deliberate or intentional indifference" to the
medical needs of prisoners as a basis for invoking the cruel and unusual punishment clause.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). Such indifference leads directly to "unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain" proscribed by the eighth amendment. Id. at 104. Under
such circumstances, a showing of direct intent to punish is not required since the alleged
punisher knowingly and responsibly causes the prisoner to suffer by restricting his liberty
and denying him the means to alleviate his pain.
133. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (second at-
tempt to execute offender after first attempt failed due to mechanical malfunction of the
electric chair did not violate cruel and unusual punishment's proscription against inflicting
unnecessary pain because the first attempt was an unforeseeable accident). The Supreme
Court has addressed this problem in the medical malpractice context:
In the medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot
be said to constitute "an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or to be "repug-
nant to the conscience of mankind." Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negli-
gent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medi-
cal mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become
a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a
cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evi-
dence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that
can offend "evolving standards of decency" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976).
134. See, e.g., J. KLmNIG, supra note 25, at 17.
135. If punishment is defined solely in terms of effect, without regard to questions of
motivation, virtually no basis exists for distinguishing punishment from treatment, compen-
sation, or regulation. See H. PACKER, supra note 63, at 19-31. Moreover, the distinction
between punishment and taxes also will be blurred, see Clark, supra note 7, at 463-79, as
will the distinction between punishment and preventive detention. See infra notes 138-43
and accompanying text. For a discussion of reasons for rejecting the effect theory, see infra
notes 158-77 and accompanying text.
136. Precise discovery of a person's state of mind is impossible. When subjective mat-
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sanctions constitute punishment on its face or, as here conceptual-
ized, cases which suspiciously resemble punishment,1 3 7 and there-
fore activate the Court's rational basis scrutiny. Wolfish offers no
solution apart from intimating that its context triggers this scru-
tiny. Indeed, the traditional pretrial detention setting reflects
many of the earmarks of punishment. For example, a person is in-
carcerated before trial only after the state establishes probable
cause to believe that he has committed a crime. As a consequence
of that belief, the state purposely imposes highly unpleasant re-
straints upon the accused, who is often housed in the same jail and
subjected to the same conditions of confinement as convicted of-
fenders. 13 8 Thus, a court reasonably could infer that a pretrial de-
tainee was intentionally punished when the state subjects the de-
tainee to unnecessarily harsh treatment.13' The inference of
punishment is more difficult to draw in situations in which re-
straints are not triggered by criminal conduct, or for that matter
by any conduct at all. In these cases the "earmarks of punishment"
begin to dissipate.14 0 Therefore, the Wolfish "punishment on its
face" standard may be of little utility outside the suspiciously pu-
nitive context of pretrial detention. Wolfish, however, is useful in
analyzing certain additional areas of juvenile justice, which will be
examined below."
The above discussion of Wolfish suggests that the pretrial con-
finement in that case reflected preventive detention and not pun-
ishment. Distinguishing preventive detention from punishment is
useful not only to understand the abstract contours of the concept
of punishment but also to further the analysis of juvenile cases.1 '
Preventive detention is defined as the restriction of liberty of per-
sons whose present status poses a perceived danger to society. The
danger in Wolfish was the risk that the suspect would abscond
ters are legally relevant, they are inferred through objective appraisals of external evidence.
These inferences are generally made by appeal, either consciously or unconsciously, to a
standard of rationality. The question asked is "what would a 'reasonable person' have been
thinking in these circumstances?" See J. HALL, supra note 27, at 121, 163.
137. The author prefers the "suspiciously resembling punishment" characterizations
to the Wolfish Court's "punishment on its face" language because the former does not ex-
plicitly beg the question of punishment.
138. See, e.g., Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289, 301 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Collins v.
Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 267 (D. Md. 1972).
139. See supra notes 132 & 136.
140. Consider, for example, the whole range of involuntary mental health commit-
ments as well as preventive detention settings such as quarantines and protective custody.
141. See infra notes 178-240 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 241-324 and accompanying text.
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before trial. 143 While the state looks backward when punishing of-
fenders for their past conduct, the government preventively de-
tains a suspect based on his present and future dangerousness.
Past conduct may provide useful evidence in assessing the sus-
pect's dangerousness-and in the pretrial confinement context ac-
tually triggers the inquiry into present status-but preventive de-
tention is inherently forward-looking in its efforts to avert the
occurrence of undesirable future events.
D. Punishment v. Therapy
Therapeutic dispositions, like preventive detentions, some-
times display punitive characteristics. Involuntary therapy often
entails not only a stigma to the patient and severe restriction of his
liberty, but also painful and unpleasant treatment."" Despite its
similarity to punishment, however, therapy is a concept analyti-
cally distinct from punishment.145 Thus, the Supreme Court sug-
gested in Robinson v. California1 46 that while the Constitution may
allow the state to subject drug addicts to involuntary therapy,147
the state violates the eighth amendment when it punishes addicts
for their addiction. 48 Although the Court frequently has discussed
143. See 441 U.S. at 528, 534.
144. See generally, Gobert, Psychosurgery, Conditioning, and the Prisoner's Right to
Refuse "Rehabilitation," 61 VA. L. REv. 155 (1975); Symonds, Mental Patients' Rights to
Refuse Drugs: Involuntary Medication as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 701 (1980); Comment, Right to Treatment for the Civilly Committed: A New
Eighth Amendment Basis, 45 U. CHi. L. REv. 731 (1978); Developments, supra note 128, at
1344-50.
145. A variety of theorists distinguish punishment from therapy. See, e.g., T. FONDER-
ICK, supra note 97, at 1; H. PAcKER, supra note 63, at 25-28; Morris, supra note 3; Wasser-
strom, supra note 27, at 179. For a view that involuntary therapy is logically impossible, see
Coleman & Solomon, supra note 113, at 350-51.
146. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
147. "[A] State might establish a program of compulsory treatment for those addicted
to narcotics. Such a program of treatment might require periods of involuntary confine-
ment." Id. at 665 (dicta).
148. Id. at 667. The Robinson Court utilized the cruel and unusual punishment clause
to strike down a California statute that punished persons adjudged to be drug addicts with a
sentence of ninety days in the county jail. The eighth amendment violation occurred be-
cause the statute punished the status of drug addiction rather than a specific criminal act.
Id. at 666-67.
The majority of the Robinson Court simply assumed that the jail term constituted pun-
ishment. The Court said, "To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not in the abstract, a
punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the
abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of
having a common cold." Id. at 667. Justice Clark argued in dissent that the confinement
may have constituted therapy rather than punishment. Id. at 679-81 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Interesting conceptual problems arise when one speaks of punishing a status. If punish-
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the concept of punishment, it has never directed much attention to
defining therapy and to distinguishing it from punishment. Fortu-
nately, commentators have provided valuable insights into this dis-
tinction by describing therapy as purposeful behavior toward an-
other person that is intended to alter that person's condition in a
manner beneficial to him. This purportedly beneficial behavior is
always subject to revision upon a showing that a different mode of
behavior would produce more beneficial results, or that a change in
the person's condition has eliminated the need for further
therapy.
149
Examination of the role of offensive conduct illustrates the es-
sential difference between coercive therapy and punishment. The
distinction is similar to that between preventive detention and
punishment. In cases of punishment, the state imposes restraints
upon persons because they have committed offenses. Cases of ther-
apy, however, do not involve necessarily a relation between the re-
straints imposed upon the person and his past conduct.1 °0 Ther-
apy-like preventive detention and unlike punishment-is a
forward-looking response to a person's present undesirable status.
Unlike preventive detention, which merely incapacitates, therapy
seeks to alleviate the undesirable status conditions.
E. Summary
The Supreme Court's approach to defining punishment in-
cludes the following three characteristics. First, Wolfish suggests
that the Court will use its definitional approach to assess all claims
of governmental punishment, regardless of whether the claims pre-
sent a direct constitutional attack upon a specified statute-as in
Trop and Mendoza-Martinez-or an allegation that the restraints
constitute nonstatutorily imposed punishments. Second, from its
earliest views in Cummings to its most recent opinion in Wolfish,
the Court consistently has focused upon the intent of the alleged
punisher as an essential element to determine the presence or ab-
ment is necessarily linked to actions, see H. HART, supra note 27, then it appears logically
impossible to punish a status. Perhaps for this reason some commentators see Robinson not
as a problem of cruel punishment, but rather as one of irrational state action. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 689 (1962) (White, J., dissenting) (suggests a substan-
tive due process rather than eighth amendment basis for the case); Packer, Mens Rea and
the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107, 147-48 n.144 (Robinson is substantive due pro-
cess masquerading in eighth amendment garb).
149. See Wasserstrom, supra note 27, at 179.
150. See H. PACKER, supra note 63, at 25-26.
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sence of punishment. Last, the Court does not seem to alter its
definition of punishment to fit the particular constitutional prob-
lem at issue. Substantive and procedural constitutional rights are
included in the same punishment analysis. Thus, the Court follows
the same approach in defining punishment in the ex post facto law,
bill of attainder, and cruel and unusual punishment cases as it
does when determining the punishment concept that triggers the
procedural protections required in criminal cases.151
In summary, the surveyed cases reveal the following punish-
ment framework:
(1) Punishment is the purposeful imposition of unpleasant restraints by one
person or authority upon another person.
(2) Punishment is a sanction imposed upon a person for his offense or alleged
offense against social or moral norms of conduct that also are usually, but not
always, the subject of a preexisting legal rule that defines the offense and sets
the amount of penalty for its commission.1
52
(3) Punishment is imposed to exact retribution53 and may also operate to
deter undesirable conduct.'"
(4) Punishment is often imposed upon offenders who, in addition to violating
legal rules, are (or are believed to be) morally culpable.
Courts may discern punitive purpose from either the express words
or actions of the alleged punisher or from independent inquiries
151. Some commentators have criticized this aspect of the Court's performance.
The bill of attainder clause, as it functions in Cummings, and the eighth amend-
ment, as it was applied in Trop, each provide a medium for analysis and judgment on
the issue of congressional authority to enact a particular sanction. This synonymity of
purpose permits breeding the Cummings approach to punishment with the doctrine of
cruel and unusual punishments. But the gulf between the bill of attainder clause and
the sixth amendment is not so easily bridged. The former focuses on the scope of legis-
lative competence, the latter on the requirements of procedure. Each has its domain.
Questions of procedural adequacy arise only on the assumption that Congress has the
authority to enact a sanction. One clause is concerned with the question whether, the
other, with the question how. Transferring criteria for punishment from one clause to
the other produces strange results. It produced the result in Mendoza-Martinez of a
decision formally based on the sixth amendment, but whose rationale bespeaks a con-
cern for the issue of congressional authority.
Comment, supra note 86, at 309.
152. See Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis
of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the
Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 893, 901 (1977) (eighth amendment punishment ap-
plies not only to statutorily imposed sanctions but also to ad hoc restraints meted out by
state officials).
153. The Court nowhere defines precisely what "retribution" means. Supposedly it en-
tails such things as meting out just deserts and expressing reprobative sentiments towards
blameworthy offenders.
154. The Court does not define deterrence. Presumably, the Court uses the word in
both its general-punishment meant to deter persons other than the one being pun-
ished-and special-punishment of an offender to deter that offender-senses.
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into the possible functions of an allegedly punitive sanction. When
the state imposes restraints that suspiciously resemble punish-
ment, courts may infer a punitive purpose if the restraints are un-
reasonably harsh in relation to articulated nonpenal objectives.
Punishment is a concept analytically distinct from regulation, pre-
ventive detention, and therapy. Regulation is the imposition of
sanctions to control future conduct without necessarily attending
to anyone's past wrongdoing. Preventive detention is the pur-
poseful restriction of liberty of a person, who because of his pre-
sent status, may pose a danger. Unlike punishment, which is gener-
ally determinate 155 -that is, knowable in kind and duration at the
time the triggering offense is committed-preventive detention is
indeterminate-that is, unknowable in duration at the time of im-
position. Therapy is the alteration of a person's undesirable physi-
cal or mental condition in a manner beneficial to the person until
the undesirable condition no longer exists. Therapy is characteris-
tically indeterminate because its effectiveness is generally un-
known in advance. 56
In practice, the distinctions noted above may be difficult to
make. This Article already has discussed some of the problems
with the punishment-regulation distinction. Because the status-act
distinction is sometimes unclear,1 57 the distinctions between pun-
ishment and therapy, and punishment and preventive detention
also may be difficult to draw.
155. See Wasserstrom, supra note 27, at 179. The widespread use of indeterminate
sentencing precludes knowledge of the exact term to be served by the offender at the time of
sentencing. See Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the
Harm, 123 U. PA. L. Rv. 297, 298-99 (1974). Even under indeterminate sentencing, how-
ever, the legislature generally sets maximum sentences for given offenses.
156. See Wasserstrom, supra note 27, at 179.
157. The Robinson Court did not discuss the problem of distinguishing status and act.
In his dissenting opinion in Robinson, however, Justice White faulted the act/status distinc-
tion, and argued that the conviction rested upon the act of using drugs, an act that was
subsumed necessarily in the subject's status as an addict. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 686 (1962) (White, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968),
which addressed the issue of whether the eighth amendment prevents the conviction of a
chronic alcoholic for being drunk in public, Justice White said, "Analysis of this difficult
case is not advanced by preoccupation with the label 'condition.'... 'Being' drunk in public
is not far removed in time from the acts of 'getting' drunk and 'going' into public." 392 U.S.
at 550 n.2 (White, J., concurring); see also H. PACKER, supra note 63, at 28: "Treatment, like
punishment, is triggered by conduct. A decision for treatment is determined almost invaria-
bly by observing conduct that is thought to indicate a need for treatment. However, the
conduct need not constitute an offense, and often does not." Similarly, preventive detention
is often triggered by conduct evincing a dangerous status. The conduct, however, need not
constitute an offense. Consider, for example, the protective confinement of a person who
threatens to kill himself.
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F. In Defense of Assessing Individual Rights in Terms of the
Concept of Punishment
In light of the inexact definition of punishment, questions may
arise about a system that hinges vital constitutional rights upon
such a vague concept. Punishment is a severe legal sanction that
tends to stigmatize persons who receive it.15 Understandably,
these grave consequences require that punishment be contained by
special safeguards. All punishment, however, is not especially se-
vere."s' Indeed, some nonpunitive sanctions are more severe than
some punishments. 160 Moreover, stigma is not unique to punish-
ment,161 nor is it inherent in minor punishments such as fines or
strict liability offenses in which offenders are not assumed necessa-
rily to be blameworthy. At best, then, severity of treatment and
imposition of stigma provide only a rough explanation for the use
of punishment as a determinant of constitutional rights.
Because of the Court's failure to formulate a definition of pun-
ishment that encompasses all instances of severe and stigmatizing
sanctions, critics have argued that the concept is too narrowly de-
fined and should, therefore, either be abandoned as a means for
assessing legal rights1 62 or expanded to avoid the injustice of fail-
ure to protect all persons who are stigmatized by severe govern-
mental sanctions.6 3 Many theorists who advocate an expansion of
the definition of punishment reject punitive motivation as a neces-
sary condition for the concept and argue instead for an effect the-
158. Some forms of punishment-the death penalty for example-have no comparable
analogues in terms of their severity among nonpunitive sanctions. Moreover, other forms of
punishment, specifically imprisonment, are often extremely severe and, when joined by the
accompanying stigma, become sui generis. "[The combination of stigma and loss of liberty
involved in a conditional or absolute sentence of imprisonment sets that sanction apart from
anything else the law imposes." H. PACKER, supra note 63, at 131. For views of the signifi-
cance of the stigmatizing effect of punishment, see J. FEINBERG, supra note 27, at 95-118.
See also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975) (proceeding is essentially criminal if possi-
ble consequences include stigma and loss of liberty for several years).
159. Consider, for example, the common employment of money fines as a criminal
sanction. Such sanctions are hardly severe to offenders of substantial economic means.
160. Compare, for example, the severity of a criminal fine of $100 to a damage award
for thousands of dollars. Indeed, "with the possible exception of death, exactly the same
kinds of unpleasant consequences, objectively considered, can be and are imposed upon un-
successful defendants in civil proceedings." Hart, supra note 38, at 404.
161. For example, damage awards may entail stigmatization. See Clark, supra note 7,
at 408. Mental health commitments may also entail stigmatizations. Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979).
162. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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ory of punishment as described earlier in this Article.1"
The Supreme Court's concept of punishment, however, is not
indefensible. First, the Court's theory of punishment, with its pu-
nitive motivation requirement, is far from arbitrary. Rather, the
theory clearly agrees with much of the philosophical literature
treating the concept of punishment.'6 5 Additionally, the effect the-
ory fails to recognize that punishment is essentially an activity
concept. 6 ' To the extent that the Court's definitional task is to
articulate the meaning of a term of ordinary language it has done
so remarkably well. 167 Of course, the Court's work extends beyond
a mere formulation of an abstract definition. The Court's defini-
tions must promote underlying constitutional values and avoid in-
justice. These interests need not be offended by the Court's defini-
tional scheme, even in cases in which the Court concludes that a
given restraint is nonpunitive and, thus, not governed automati-
cally by the constitutional considerations applicable in cases of
punishment. The Court has never held that the concept of punish-
ment is the sole determinant of constitutional rights of persons
subjected to highly coercive governmental sanctions. Nonpunitive
treatment of a cruel, unreasonably harsh, or stigmatizing nature
can and should be subjected to scrutiny under a variety of consti-
tutional doctrines that are not logically tied to the concept of pun-
ishment.168 Moreover, persons placed in jeopardy of receiving such
treatment can and should receive procedural protections approach-
164. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., H. HART, supra note 27; J. KLEINIG, supra note 25, at 41-42; Wasaer-
strom, supra note 27, at 179.
166. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
167. Judicial attention to ordinary language contexts is certainly not inappropriate.
Indeed, while
[t]he central concern in any definitional inquiry should be the purpose for which the
definition is sought. Ordinary usage ... must serve as at least a starting point. A con-
cept cannot be defined in a vacuum; before one asks how a concept should be construed
so as to be consonant with certain policies or purposes, one must determine the general
contours of the concept. Examination of ordinary usage elucidates these contours.
Note, supra note 31, at 1678 n.80.
168. The Court in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 719, 723-39 (1972) eschewed a
cruel and unusual punishment analysis in favor of equal protection and due process doc-
trines and invalidated the involuntary pretrial hospitalization of a criminal defendant found
incompetent to stand trial under statutes which resulted in a more restrictive confinement
than that imposed upon persons involuntarily hospitalized through other statutes. See, e.g.,
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (state "cannot [consistent with every
man's right to liberty] confine [in hospital] without more a nondangerous individual who is
capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible
[others]"); see also supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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ing those provided to criminal defendants.169
Adoption of the effect theory of punishment would effectively
eliminate the punishment/therapy and punishment/preventive de-
tention distinctions that the Court has painstakingly drawn. Under
the effect theory, any involuntary therapy of an unpleasant nature
arguably could be punitive.1 70 Once characterized as punitive, the
treatment seemingly would become unconstitutional under Robin-
son v. California as punishment for a status.171 This reasoning
would render the whole institution of civil commitment constitu-
tionally suspect. By the same analysis, varieties of preventive de-
tention-even in such relatively benign forms as quarantines for
control of infectious disease-would look suspiciously like punish-
ment for a status if the detention should be labeled punishment
under the effect theory. Similarly, a variety of procedural conse-
quences would follow if the concept of punishment were substi-
tuted for present notions of therapy and preventive detention. If
not rendered altogether unconstitutional under Robinson, deten-
tions that are presently characterized as therapeutic or preventive
seemingly could occur only after the provision of the full panoply
of protections presently available to criminal defendants. The wis-
dom of such an innovation is debatable.71
While effect theorists chide the Court for generating too nar-
row a concept of punishment, others may object to the definition
for being too broad. If some punishments entail little or no stigma-
169. Due process concepts that are not logically tied to punishment or criminal pro-
ceedings may be utilized to achieve similar procedural effects as those resulting when pun-
ishment exists. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,431-33 (1979) (elevated standard
of proof approaching that utilized in "criminal" cases required by due process in civil com-
mitment proceedings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (rights to notice, counsel, confronta-
tion, etc. required under due process clause); see also Rossman, The Scope of the Sixth
Amendment: Who Is a Criminal Defendant., 12 AM. Crai. L. Rxv. 633, 650 (1975) (due
process considerations require appointment of counsel in certain civil proceedings).
170. Coleman & Solomon, supra note 113, at 350-53 (defining all involuntary therapy
as punishment).
171. See Developments, supra note 128, at 1331.
172. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429-30 (1979) (discussion of the im-
possibility of applying the criminal standard of proof to the evaluations of status inherent in
mental health commitments). The Court's present rejection of the effect theory of punish-
ment in favor of a requirement of punitive intent, when considered in conjunction with the
Court's flexible use of due process, permits the transplanting of appropriate aspects of crim-
inal procedure into civil proceedings without inappropriately criminalizing such proceedings.
Compare In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination applicable to delinquency adjudications) with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971) (holding sixth amendment right to jury trial not applicable to delinquency
adjudications).
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tization and are of minor severity, why impose all the expensive
and time-consuming procedures of the criminal process? The
Court has answered, at least partially, these objections in decisions
limiting sixth amendment rights to counsel and jury trials to situa-
tions in which defendants risk substantial punishment and
stigmatization. 13
Critics frequently raise two other objections to the use of pun-
ishment as a standard for constitutional rights. First, they under-
score the difficulty a court encounters when ascertaining whether a
legislature had a punitive motivation. Although all assessments of
subjective states of mind are difficult,174 the punitive motivation
requirement is especially problematic because it often entails an
assessment of collective legislative intent. Commentators have ex-
amined this problem in depth, 1  reducing the necessity for a simi-
lar examination here. The collective intent problem is not unique
to the Court's concept of punishment and has proven to be rela-
tively manageable in other doctrinal areas.1 7e Moreover, to the ex-
tent that Wolfish permits inferences of punitive intent, the collec-
tive intent problem is avoided altogether. Last, some critics
advocate the abandonment of punishment as an analytical stan-
dard because of its vagueness. Although punishment admittedly is
an inexact notion, the concept seems more precise than alterna-
tives such as "fundamental fairness," which would likely replace
the punishment concept as an analytical vehicle. 77
The concept of punishment, however inexact its definition,
and rough the explanation for its use, is firmly entrenched in the
legal system as a mechanism for defining the reach of the Constitu-
tion. The concept's recent employment in Wolfish suggests that
the Court is likely to continue to analyze a variety of rights in
terms of the presence or absence of punishment.
173. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (sixth amendment right to counsel
limited to cases where imprisonment occurs). Of course this right also exists in capital cases.
See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 676 (1948). The Court has held that the right to trial by
jury exists only in cases involving potential imprisonment of more than six months. Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
174. See supra note 136.
175. See Clark, supra note 7, at 435-91.
176. See generally Gardner, Illicit Legislative Motivation as a Sufficient Condition
for Unconstitutionality Under the Establishment Clause-A Case for Consideration: The
Utah Firing Squad, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 435.
177. For a discussion of the employment of the fundamental fairness test as an alter-
native analysis, see infra notes 180-88 and accompanying text.
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III. JUVENILE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREME COURT
A. In re Gault
Although earlier doctrinal development existed,1 78  In re
Gault179 marked the first major effort by the United States Su-
preme Court to relate constitutional principles to the juvenile jus-
tice system. The Court reviewed the constitutionality of the com-
mitment of fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault to the Arizona State
Industrial School for a period not to exceed Gault's twenty-first
birthday. Gerald's commitment was the result of a delinquency ad-
judication, conducted without procedural formality,"8" at which it
was determined that he had made an obscene phone call. The
Court held that Gerald and others in similar situations who risk
incarceration in state correction facilities if found to be delin-
quents are constitutionally entitled to the following rights in their
adjudication proceedings: Notice of the charges, assistance of coun-
sel, rights of confrontation and cross-examination, and the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 181 The Gault Court rejected the
view that the juvenile justice system is an entirely benign dis-
penser of parens patriae therapy and rehabilitation to youths who
deviate from socially accepted norms of conduct. The juvenile sys-
tem, which was historically characterized by a procedural informal-
ity that was intended to protect youthful offenders from the harsh-
ness of criminal proceedings, 182 began with high motives and
178. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (enumeration of procedural rights
under the District of Columbia Code in proceedings waiving juvenile court jurisdiction to
the adult criminal process). See generally Paulsen, supra note 4.
179. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
180. After a complaint by a neighbor that Gerald Gault had made an obscene phone
call, Gault was taken into custody by police. The arresting officer initiated the adjudication
proceeding by filing a petition in juvenile court alleging only that Gerald Gault was "'under
the age of eighteen years, and is in need of the protection of this Honorable Court; [and
that] said minor is a delinquent minor."' Id. at 5. The petition alleged no factual basis for
the judicial action proposed and was never served on Gerald or his parents. Gerald appeared
without counsel at a hearing that was held on the petition. The complaining neighbor did
not attend and no record of the proceedings was prepared. The juvenile judge questioned
Gerald about the neighbor's complaint as related to the judge by the arresting officer to
whom Gault apparently had admitted making the obscene call. Six days later, at a hearing
at which Gault was again unrepresented by counsel, the judge sentenced Gault to the State
Industrial School "'for the period of his minority [until 21], unless sooner discharged by
due process of law."' Id. at 7-8.
181. Id. at 31-57. The Court chose not to rule on whether juvenile courts are required
to provide transcripts of their proceedings to appealing litigants or whether juvenile pro-
ceedings are subject to appellate review. Id. at 57-58.
182. The supposed virtues of procedural informality in the juvenile system are ex-
plained by one commentator a follows:
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enlightened goals. In reality, however, the system had failed to at-
tain its rehabilitative goals and often was nothing more than a
mechanism that stigmatized youths as delinquents 88 and re-
stricted their liberty.M Thus, the Gault Court found that the es-
sentials of due process and fair treatment under the fourteenth
amendment entitled juveniles to increased procedural
protections.185
By relying upon the concept of fundamental fairness under
the due process clause for these procedural protections, the Court
did not specifically find that juvenile sanctions such as those im-
posed upon Gerald Gault were punitive-even though such a find-
ing would have provided an alternative basis for engrafting the
Gault protections upon the juvenile system.18 The Court averted
Not only was the aim of a court for children to differ from that of the criminal
court; its way of going about things was to be changed as well. Procedure had to be
"socialized." "The purpose of the juvenile court is to prevent the child's being tried
and treated as a criminal; all means should be taken to prevent the child and his par-
ents from forming the conception that the child is being tried for a crime." The respon-
dent to a petition filed in his own interest replaced the defendant to a criminal charge
filed in the interest of the state. Trials by jury should be permitted "under no circum-
stances," because "they are inconsistent with both the law and the theory upon which
children's codes are founded." Hearings were not to be "public trials" lest youngsters
be damaged by publicity. Little or no need would be found for the respondent to have
a lawyer; "the judge represents both parties and the law."...
Not to be overlooked is another aspect of the insistence on informality in court.
The community has never been much concerned with the impact of criminal procedure
on the feelings of an accused. If he is terrified by the courtroom scene, so much the
better. A malefactor might thus be convicted never to return. The reformers, on the
other hand, sought to dispel the fear that can accompany a child's day in court. They
perceived the appearance before the juvenile court judge as the beginning of the treat-
ment process, a beginning that should not make the total job of serving a child's needs
more difficult. If the state is to act like a father, its representative, the judge, should
act like one at the hearing. The respondent child. . . should "be made to feel that he
is the object of [the court's] care and solicitude. The ordinary trappings of the court-
room are out of place in such hearings. The judge on a bench, looking down upon the
boy standing at the bar, can never evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk,
with the child at his side, where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder
and draw the lad to him, the judge, while losing none of his judicial dignity, will gain
immensely in the effectiveness of his work."
Paulsen, supra note 4, at 170-72 (footnotes omitted).
183. "[Supposedly,] one of the important benefits of the special juvenile court proce-
dures is that they avoid classifying the juvenile as a 'criminal.' The juvenile offender is now
classed as a 'delinquent.'... [T]his term has to come to involve only slightly less stigma
than the term 'criminal' applied to adults." 387 U.S. at 23-24 (footnote omitted).
184. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
185. The Court found that the due process protections would not detract from the
rehabilitative mission-to the extent that this actually exists-of the juvenile courts. In fact,
the protections might even promote rehabilitation. 387 U.S. at 26-27.
186. See supra note 5.
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the complete criminalization of delinquency adjudications by
avoiding a specific finding that confinement of juvenile delinquents
constitutes punishment.187 The more flexible fundamental fairness
standard permitted the Court to impose certain procedural re-
quirements upon the juvenile system without stating that juveniles
are entitled to the full panoply of fifth, sixth, and eighth amend-
ment rights available to criminal defendants.8 s The Gault Court,
however, deviated from the fundamental fairness approach by rely-
ing directly upon the fifth amendment and its specific application
to criminal cases 89 in holding that the privilege against self-in-
crimination applied to state delinquency adjudications."90 The
Court based its analysis of the applicability of the privilege on the
view that the juvenile system is the functional equivalent of the
criminal system.0 1 Thus, the Court's position seems to be not so
much that due process fairness requires the application of the priv-
ilege, but that juvenile proceedings are essentially "criminal" pro-
ceedings for purposes of the privilege."" Because the Court con-
sistently has viewed the dispensation of punishment as the
defining characteristic of criminal law, the conclusion, that the
Court saw the sanction imposed in Gault as punitive is difficult to
avoid.1
9 3
Although the Gault Court may have implicitly held that the
juvenile system is in some aspects and for some purposes punitive,
the Court failed expressly to provide a useful standard for identify-
ing juvenile punishment in future cases. At several points in its
opinion, however, the Court intimated that the unpleasantness ex-
187. See id.
188. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (no right to jury trials
for juveniles in delinquency adjudications). For a more detailed discussion of McKeiver, see
infra notes 217-28 and accompanying text.
189. 387 U.S. at 47-49.
190. "[J]uvenile proceedings to determine 'delinquency,' which may lead to commit-
ment in a state institution, must be regarded as 'criminal' for purposes of the privilege
against self-incrimination." Id. at 49.
191. Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal
for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 656, 665-71 (1980).
192. The Gault Court specifically noted that the privilege against self-incrimination
protects values other than those values protected by due process fundamental fairness.
While the latter generally speak to accurate factfinding in legal proceedings, see Rosenberg,
supra note 191, at 677, "[t]he roots of the privilege are ... far deeper. They tap the basic
stream of religious and political principle because the privilege reflects the limits of the
individual's attornment to the state and-in a philosophical sense-insists upon the equal-
ity of the individual and the state." 387 U.S. at 47 (footnote omitted); see also supra notes
190-91 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 5.
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perienced by involuntarily confined juveniles is itself sufficient to
constitute a finding- of punishment. Because adjudications
favorable to the state often result in significant restrictions of lib-
erty in both juvenile and adult criminal proceedings, the Court
equated the two proceedings. "A proceeding where the issue is
whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to
the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a
felony prosecution. 1 9 4 In the same vein, the Court stated,
Ultimately, however, we confront the reality of that portion of the Juve-
nile Court process with which we deal in this case. A boy is charged with
misconduct. The boy is committed to an institution where he may be re-
strained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence-and of
limited practical meaning-that the institution to which he is committed is
called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemis-
tic the title, a "receiving home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an
institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or
lesser time. His world becomes "a building with whitewashed walls, regi-
mented routine and institutional hours.... ." Instead of mother and father
and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by
guards, custodians, state employees, and "delinquents" confined with him for
anything from waywardness to rape and homicide. 196
To the extent that such language provides a definitional approach
to punishment, it focuses entirely on the effect of the alleged pun-
ishment upon its subject. On its face, the Court's opinion suggests
an effect theory of punishment and has been so read by some
courts and commentators. 196 Nevertheless, when one reads Gault
in conjunction with other Supreme Court cases, the conclusion
that the Court intended to espouse the effect theory seems
unlikely.1 9
7
The Gault Court could have avoided these confusions by ana-
lyzing the case explicitly in terms of the concept of punishment.
Because of the expressed skepticism concerning the adequacy of
the avowed nonpunitive purposes of delinquency dispositions, the
Court easily could have found the dispositions punitive under its
traditional punishment definition. Offenders receive unpleasant re-
straints because of their offenses against the criminal law. Juvenile
dispositions suspiciously resemble punishment,198 which triggers
194. 387 U.S. at 36.
195. Id. at 27 (footnotes omitted).
196. See authorities cited supra notes 29-30.
197. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
198. Compare the "suspiciously punitive" setting of pretrial detention, supra notes
137-40 and accompanying text, with that depicted by the Gault Court. While juveniles, un-
like pretrial detainees, may not be housed routinely in the same facility with convicted of-
fenders, the Gault Court's description of juvenile confinement, see supra note 195, suggests
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inquiry into the reasonableness of the restraints in relation to their
nonpunitive purposes. If this inquiry revealed that the restraints
were excessive, then punitive intent would be inferred and the dis-
position would be labeled punishment. Although this approach is
aided by'the Wolfish test for inferring punitive intent-a test not
yet fully developed at the time of Gault-the Gault Court could
have employed the similar Mendoza-Martinez excessiveness stan-
dard to reach the same result obtained through Wolfish.'" Other
aspects of Gault deserve brief attention. The Court's attempts to
narrow the scope of the opinion to the delinquency adjudication
stage diminishes Gault's usefulness as a basis for assessing the con-
stitutional rights of juveniles. Thus, whether the Gault protections
extend to pre-or post-adjudication problems or to such nondelin-
quency situations as PINS 00 or neglect proceedings is uncertain. 20 1
Moreover, Gault's applicability to delinquency adjudications in
which the petition, unlike that in Gerald Gault's case, is premised
upon an act or upon a finding of a status202 that would not be a
crime if committed by an adult is not clear.203 Finally, the Gault
Court did not specify the types of deprivations of liberty that are
sufficient to trigger the procedural protections. The risk of "incar-
ceration against one's will" clearly suffices, 204 but the Court also
a prison-like atmosphere similar to that experienced by pretrial detainees.
199. As one of its tests for punishment Mendoza-Martinez asks "whether the sanction
.. . appears excessive in relation to . . . alternative [nonpunitive] purpose[s] assigned."
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963); see supra text accompanying
note 82. Indeed, without specifically relying upon any of the Court's cases defining punish-
ment, Justice Black in his concurring opinion in Gault found delinquency proceedings to be
criminal for purposes of the fifth and sixth amendment-
[I]n a juvenile system designed to lighten or avoid punishment for criminality, [Gault]
was ordered by the State to six years' confinement in what is in all but name a peniten-
tiary or jail.
Where a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State, charged, and convicted
for violating a state criminal law, and then ordered by the State to be confined for six
years, I think the Constitution requires that he be tried in accordance with the guaran-
tees of all the provisions of the Bill of Rights ....
387 U.S. at 61 (Black, J., concurring).
200. The acronym stands for "persons in need of supervision."
201. 387 U.S. at 13 (pre-judicial and dispositional stages of juvenile proceedings not
necessarily touched by Gault).
202. As defined under most statutes delinquency is a concept that is not limited to the
commission of acts that would be crimes if committed by adults, but includes as well a
variety of status conditions such as "being disobedient to parents" or "truanting from
school." See S. Fox, JuvENIE CouRTS 40 (2d ed. 1977).
203. The Gault Court appears to limit its holding to situations of misconduct, perhaps
excluding delinquency adjudications based on status. See 387 U.S. at 13.
204. Id. at 50.
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suggested that any "threatened .. .deprivation of . . . liberty"
may also be enough to entitle the juvenile to the Gault
protections. o5
B. Gault's Progeny
The Court continued to expand the protections applicable to
delinquency adjudications in In re Winship.2°6 In Winship the
Court held that juveniles charged in delinquency proceedings with
acts that would be crimes if committed by adults are entitled as a
matter of due process right to the reasonable doubt standard of
proof. The Court noted that the reasonable doubt standard is con-
stitutionally required in adult criminal cases to minimize the risks
of subjecting innocent persons to the stigma and loss of liberty in-
herent in criminal conviction and punishment.20 Similar risks re-
quire that the same standard be applied in delinquency proceed-
ings. "[Judicial] intervention cannot take the form of subjecting
the child to the stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law
and to the possibility of institutional confinement on proof insuffi-
cient to convict him were he an adult. 1 °20 8 As in Gault, the Winship
Court avoided any explicit finding that the juvenile process was
punitive and, therefore, governed by procedural protections unique
to the criminal system. Instead, the Court focused on two aspects
of juvenile dispositions-the potential for stigma and the potential
for severely restricting liberty-as the reasons for requiring the
reasonable doubt standard.
The juvenile justice system's potential for stigmatizing and de-
nying liberty, however, was not the Winship Court's sole motivat-
ing force. Indeed, nine years later in Addington v. Texas2' " the Su-
preme Court rejected the argument, based upon Winship, that the
loss of liberty and the stigma that occurred through involuntary
hospitalization of the mentally ill constituted sufficient grounds for
requiring the reasonable doubt standard in civil commitment pro-
ceedings. Acknowledging that significant stigma and loss of liberty
are inherent in mental health commitments, 210 the Addington
Court, nevertheless, distinguished the civil commitment process
from the procedures in Winship. Unlike the juvenile system, which
205. Id.
206. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
207. Id. at 363.
208. Id. at 367 (footnote omitted).
209. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
210. See id. at 425-26.
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imposes its stigma and restriction of liberty upon offenders be-
cause of their past offenses, the commitment process focuses on
present status of the defendant and attempts to determine his pre-
sent dangerousness and need for confinement and therapy.'11
Therefore, the central issue in Winship was "a straight forward
factual question-did the accused commit the act alleged"3'1 -- but
in Addington the Court grappled with an evaluation of the pa-
tient's mental health, a difficult subjective judgment of an inher-
ently doubtful nature.213 The Court concluded that the reasonable
doubt standard would frustrate the purposes of commitment pro-
ceedings and, therefore, ought not be required.
The Winship/Addington distinction may be understood
through the punishment/therapy distinction. The state imposes
unpleasant sanctions upon juvenile offenders only after it has
shown that offenses have been committed. Obviously, the sanction
necessarily is related to a showing of past conduct of a wrongful
nature. Thus, punishment accurately describes the sanction.
1 4
Hence, since offenders in Winship situations risk punishment at
the hands of the state, the protections afforded criminal defen-
dants must be provided. This conclusion, however, does not follow
in Addington. In civil commitment proceedings the inquiry focuses
upon the defendant's status. His past actions are either irrelevant
or only incidentally relevant. Therefore, punishment does not re-
sult from decisions unfavorable to defendants in commitment pro-
ceedings.2' 5 The procedural protections unique to the criminal pro-
cess are inapplicable to these therapeutic contexts.'1
One year after Winship, the Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylva-
nia'17 held that juveniles were not entitled to jury trials in adjudi-
cation hearings even though the underlying offenses would be
criminal offenses if committed by adults' 18 and the consequences
211. Id. at 428-29.
212. Id. at 429.
213. Id. at 429-30.
214. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text, for a definition of therapy.
216. The conclusion does not mean that litigants in civil commitment proceedings
should go without procedural protections. Indeed, due process consideration should provide
these protections. See Developments, supra note 128, at 1271-1316. When protections are
provided, however, they arise from due process considerations and not because the proceed-
ings are criminal under the fifth and sixth amendments. See supra note 5.
217. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
218. McKeiver and the companion cases concerned a variety of criminal conduct rang-




of adjudications unfavorable to the juveniles entailed possible con-
finement in state institutions. Reasoning that neither Gault nor
Winship compelled the conclusion that delinquency proceedings
are criminal prosecutions for purposes of the sixth amendment
right to jury trial,219 a plurality of the Court concluded that due
process concerns for fundamental fairness would not be offended if
juries were excluded from the adjudication process.220 Unlike the
Gault/Winship rights of notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-ex-
amination and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which all empha-
size accurate factfinding, the plurality found that juries are not
necessary to achieve that interest.221 Moreover, juries in juvenile
cases might actually be counterproductive. "If the jury trial were
to be injected into the juvenile court system as a matter of right, it
would bring with it the traditional delay, the formality, and the
clamor of the public trial.21 22 If these consequences were to befall
the juvenile courts "there [would be] little need for [their] separate
existence.
' 223
Noticeably absent from the McKeiver plurality's discussion
.was any attempt to explain Gault's application of the privilege
against self-incrimination to delinquency adjudications.224 By fail-
ing to list the privilege among the other Gault/Winship rights, all
of which were fundamental fairness requirements to achieve "accu-
rate factfinding," the plurality apparently recognized that the the-
oretical underpinnings of the privilege rested neither in a concern
219. "[The juvenile court proceeding has not yet been held to be a 'criminal prosecu-
tion' within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 541.
220. Justices Blackmun, Stewart, White, and Chief Justice Burger comprised the plu-
rality. Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment and filed a separate opinion. Justice Bren-
nan concurred in part and dissented in part. Justices Douglas, Black, and Marshall
dissented.
221. 403 U.S. at 543.
222. Id. at 550.
223. Id. at 551. The dissent pointed out that juries in juvenile cases might actually
promote the system's rehabilitative aims. "The child who feels that he has been dealt with
fairly and not merely expediently or as speedily as possible will be a better prospect for
rehabilitation." Id. at 566 (dissenting opinion).
224. The plurality apparently did not see Gault's inclusion of the privilege against
self-incrimination as grounded in due process. "Due process [in Gault] was held to embrace
adequate written notice; advice as to the right to counsel, retained or appointed; confronta-
tion; and cross-examination. The privilege against self-incrimination was also held available
to the juvenile." Id. at 532. At another point in the opinion, the plurality excludes mention
of the privilege entirely when discussing the due process dimensions of Gault and Winship.
"As that standard [fundamental fairness] was applied in those two cases, we have an em-
phasis on factfinding procedures. The requirements of notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-
examination, and standard of proof naturally flowed from this emphasis." Id. at 543.
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for accurate factfinding nor in a notion of fundamental fairness."'
The McKeiver plurality, like the Gault majority, appears to see
juvenile adjudications as functionally equivalent to criminal cases
within the meaning of the fifth amendment itself. Apart from sug-
gestions that juries might be counterproductive in the juvenile sys-
tem-an argument which one could make with similar force
against Gault's extension of the privilege against self-incrimination
to juvenile defendants"22'-the plurality left unexplained why the
system is characterized as criminal for purposes of the fifth amend-
ment privilege but not for the sixth amendment right to jury trial.
Indeed, if the issue in McKeiver had been framed in terms of
whether the juvenile sanction constituted punishment,,27 the plu-
rality might have recognized delinquency adjudications as criminal
prosecutions within the meaning of the sixth amendment and
thereby have entitled juveniles to the right to trial by jury.2
28
Although McKeiver, like Gault and Winship before it, avoided
explicit reference to the concept of punishment as a measure of
constitutional rights, the Court's unanimous opinion in Breed v.
Jones2 9 openly alluded to such an analytical framework. The
Court held that the double jeopardy clause prohibits the trial of
juveniles as adults if they have been subjected previously to a de-
linquency hearing on the same charge. Jeopardy describes "the risk
that is traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution."'2 0 In-
deed, "the risk to which the term jeopardy refers is that tradition-
ally associated with 'actions intended to authorize criminal punish-
ment.""' 1 In assessing delinquency adjudications in terms of such
risks, the Court stated,
[I]t is simply too late in the day to conclude... that a juvenile is not put in
jeopardy at a proceeding whose object is to determine whether he has com-
mitted acts that violate a criminal law and whose potential consequences in-
clude both the stigma inherent in such a determination and the deprivation
of liberty for many years.
2
2
Thus, "in terms of potential consequences, there is little to distin-
225. See supra notes 192 & 224.
226. Justice Harlan made these arguments in his concurring opinion in In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 74-77 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
227. Each of the litigants in McKeiver agreed that fundamental fairness was the basis
for Gault and Winship, 403 U.S. at 543.
228. See supra notes 5 & 196-97 and accompanying text.
229. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
230. Id. at 528.




guish an adjudicatory hearing such as was held in this case from a
traditional criminal prosecution. 2 " Both proceedings are designed
"to vindicate [the] very vital interest in enforcement of criminal
laws.12 3 The Court concluded, therefore, that the juvenile respon-
dent was put in jeopardy at the delinquency adjudication
hearing.
235
The Court's analysis in Breed does not refer to the fundamen-
tal fairness standard employed in Gault, Winship, and McKeiver.
Instead, the case rests entirely on the conclusion that delinquency
dispositions are the functional equivalents of criminal punish-
ments. Although delinquency dispositions seem to be tantamount
to punishment, the Breed Court made no attempt to show the
presence of punitive motivation in juvenile dispositions and
seemed content instead to rest its conclusion upon the stigma and
incapacitating effects of these dispositions. This analysis, however,
which was also suggested in Gault, is misleading. It implies the
effect theory of punishment, a doctrine clearly antithetical to the
Court's cases from Cummings to Wolfish. Again, as in Gault, pun-
ishment probably could have been found in Breed if the Court had
applied its traditional punitive intent framework 236 instead of ap-
pearing to adopt the effect theory.
Breed poses a problem for the continued vitality of McKeiver.
If juvenile dispositions are punishment for fifth amendment double
jeopardy purposes, why not also for purposes of sixth amendment
jury trial rights? McKeiver and Breed, however, are distinguisha-
ble on two grounds. First, the McKeiver Court opined that jury
trials may frustrate whatever rehabilitative potential the juvenile
system possesses. The Breed Court, however, found no similar ef-
fect when applying double jeopardy principles to the system.
37
Second, since Breed arose through a federal habeas corpus petition
challenging a state criminal conviction, it may no longer be a true
"delinquency case" because the juvenile court had abandoned its
rehabilitative efforts and had relinquished the child to the adult
criminal system.2 8 McKeiver, on the other hand, takes place en-
tirely within the "therapeutic" context of the juvenile setting. Al-
233. Id. at 530.
234. Id. at.531 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971)).
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
237. 421 U.S. at 535-41 (double jeopardy protections will not diminish desired flex-
ibility and informality and may even promote the objectives of the juvenile justice system).
238. Rosenberg, supra note 191, at 681.
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though parens patriae assertions might have provided some basis
for preventing application of the constitutional guarantee in McK-
eiver, 2 9 these assertions were inapposite in Breed.24
C. Summary
Gault, Winship, McKeiver, and Breed illustrate three mani-
festations of punishment's analytical role in juvenile cases. In some
instances, as in Gault and Winship, the concept may operate
merely as an alternative means to obtain the same results yielded
by the fundamental fairness standard. In other cases, however, as
exemplified by McKeiver, different outcomes may result depending
upon whether fundamental fairness or the concept of punishment
is applied. Finally, Breed suggests that certain issues are properly
analyzed entirely in terms of the concept of punishment without
reference to fundamental fairness.
The Court's cases from Gault to Breed demonstrate clearly
that the juvenile justice system reflects a mixture of therapeutic
and punitive concerns. To the extent that the system is punitive,
important constitutional consequences follow. Yet, apart from mis-
leading reliance upon the effect theory, the Court's juvenile cases
provide no definition of punishment- much less a standard for
distinguishing punishment from therapy. Therefore, those at-
tempting to draw such a distinction must look beyond the juvenile
cases to discover the proper analytical framework necessary for
conducting the inquiry.
IV. THE CONCEPT OF PUNISHMENT APPLIED: SOME CASES FOR
ILLUSTRATION
The preceding sections have defined the concept of punish-
ment and suggested that it provides a useful and sometimes even
necessary means for analyzing juvenile problems. Nevertheless, an
examination of the cases reveals that the analytical potential of the
concept remains largely untapped. Indeed, several cases reach
questionable results simply because the courts have failed to utilize
the concept of punishment as a basis for decision.
A. Fixed Confinement: Rights to Jury Trials Reconsidered
The 1977 Delaware Supreme Court opinion in State v. J.K.2 1
239. See supra note 182.
240. Rosenberg, supra note 191, at 681.
241. 383 A.2d 283 (Del. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1009 (1978).
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upheld the constitutionality of the recently enacted Juvenile
Mandatory Commitment Act.2 4 2 The statute, among other things,
required institutional confinement for one year, subject to judicial
discretion to suspend confinement in excess of six months, of any
juvenile adjudged to be a delinquent based on the commission of
two or more burglaries within a one-year period.24 3 The juveniles
who were sentenced to mandatory confinement under the statute
alleged that they were denied both equal protection of the laws
and sixth amendment rights to trial by jury. The youths premised
the equal protection issue upon the disparate treatment afforded
youthful burglars under the juvenile and adult systems. While ju-
venile burglars found "not amenable to the rehabilitative processes
of the [Juvenile] Court" were tried as adults and were eligible for
probation upon conviction, those found "amenable" to rehabilita-
tion were retained within the juvenile system and subjected to at
least six months mandatory confinement under the statute.2  The
jury trial claim was based on the theory that potential incarcera-
tion in excess of sixth months triggered the sixth amendment
242. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 937 (1980 Cum. Supp.) (enacted July 30, 1976).
243. The entire text of the statute stated as follows:
(c) Subject to the provisions governing amenability pursuant to Section 938 of this
Chapter, the court shall commit a delinquent child to the custody of the Department of
Correction under such circumstances and for such periods of time as hereinafter
provided:
(1) Where he has been once or more than once adjudicated delinquent for commit-
ting separate and distinct acts or courses of conduct, not arising from the same transac-
tion or occurrence, committed within any one-year period, which said acts, when aggre-
gated, would constitute two offenses designated as felonies under Subchapter 11,
Chapter 5, Title 11; or attempts to commit any such felonies, or which would constitute
burglaries in any degree involving a dwelling house pursuant to Subpart B, Subchapter
III, Chapter 5, Title 11, or attempts thereof, or any combination thereof, then custody
shall be awarded for one year;
(6) Where a child is adjudicated a delinquent based upon the conditions outlined
in (c)(1), (2), (3), (4) or (5) of this Section, the Court may, at the time of sentencing or
upon subsequent hearing initiated by the filing of a petition by the Department of its
duly authorized representative, due notice of which has been given to the Attorney
General, suspend all of the commitment in excess of six months, when it determines by
a preponderance of the evidence before it that such lesser period of commitment; (1)
would best serve the needs of the child; and (2) would pose no probable threat to prop-
erty or person upon his earlier release. In the event that the Court should determine
that all or a portion of the commitment in excess of six months should be suspended as
hereinbefore provided, then it shall set forth with particularity the reasons relied upon
in so doing in its order or disposition.
60 Del. Laws 2125 (1975). The statute has since been amended removing judicial discretion
to suspend mandatory commitments, which presently are fixed at six months. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 937(c) (1980 Cum. Supp.).
244. 383 A.2d at 287-89.
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right.2 45
Notwithstanding the possibility of different treatment for
"amenable" and "nonamenable" juveniles, the court found these
differences to be permissible under the equal protection clause.
The court held that the classification drawn by the amenability
analysis constituted reasonable statutory attempts to promote the
compelling state interest in rehabilitating "amenable" youthful
burglars while excluding those not susceptible to the juvenile
court's rehabilitative potential.2' The Delaware court, however,
never addressed the possibility that the mandatory confinement
might be punitive in nature, and simply assumed that it was
rehabilitative.
The court declined to rule on the right of juveniles to jury tri-
als under the mandatory commitment statute because the issue
had not been adequately briefed by counsel. The court, however,
strongly suggested that no such right exists, "invit[ing] the atten-
tion of the Trial Courts"' 47 to a series of cases-including
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania-that denied the right to a jury in
juvenile cases. 45
If the J.K. court had utilized the concept of punishment in
analyzing its facts, the outcome might have been different. The
mandatory confinement of the "amenable" burglars seems clearly
to constitute punishment. 49 The state is imposing unpleasant re-
straints to answer a specific kind of criminal conduct. The determi-
nate nature of the restraint-a mandatory term fixed for at least
six months-strongly suggests a legislative intent to punish while
belying a rehabilitative purpose. 50 The statute did not provide an
indeterminate disposition, which is characteristic of therapeutic at-
tempts to alter undesirable status conditions, 5 1 but rather fixed a
term of confinement based solely upon the offenses committed by
youthful burglars. The punitive purposes of retribution and deter-
245. Id. at 285; see supra note 173.
246. 383 A.2d at 289.
247. Id. at 292.
248. In addition to McKeiver the court cited Raines v. Alabama, 552 F.2d 660 (5th
Cir. 1977), United States v. Hill, 538 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1976), and United States v. Torres,
500 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1974). The court also cited 100 A.L.R.2d 1241 (1965) which provides,
"[Ijt is now almost universally held that... individual[s] charged with being ... delin-
quent[s] [have] no right, under the... federal constitution, to demand that the [delin-
quence] issue... be determined by a jury." Id. at 1242-43.
249. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.




rence are evident. Indeed, the Delaware Legislature would later de-
scribe the purpose of the statute before the J.K. court as follows:
"[T]he general intention behind the enactment of a mandatory
commitment law for juveniles adjudicated delinquet [sic] for cer-
tain delineated offenses was to serve as a warning to a first of-
fender of the consequences of a second conviction.' 52 Even with-
out an express statement of punitive intent, the J.K. court easily
could have inferred punitive intent by applying the excessiveness
test of Mendoza-Martinez. Six months confinement clearly would
be excessive for "amenable" juveniles who became rehabilitated
prior to the expiration of the six-month period. Thus, the con-
finement in these cases would constitute punishment because it is
clearly "excessive in relation to the [therapeutic] purpose as-
signed.'2
5 3
Once the confinement of the "amenable" juveniles becomes
punitive rather than therapeutic, the distinction between "amena-
ble" and "nonamenable" juveniles becomes untenable. The state
subjects both classes to punishment and the denial of the possibil-
ity of probation to the "amenable" class would constitute an arbi-
trary and irrational exercise of state power.25 Moreover, the
court's suggestion that the right to a jury trial does not attach
under the mandatory commitment statute also appears unsound.
Because punishment is infficted for violation of the statute, the
proceedings become criminal prosecutions under the sixth amend-
ment and, thus, entitle juveniles to jury trials. 55
A New York family court reached this conclusion in In re Fel-
der.25' The Felder court found a sixth amendment right to jury
trials under the "designated felony" provisions of the Juvenile Jus-
tice Reform Act of 1976.'5 While labeling proceedings under the
252. 62 Del. Laws 749 (1979) (act amending the statutory provision before the J.K.
court).
253. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Similar conclusions may be derived
from the Wolfish test. The confinement in J.K. would appear to be punitive on its face since
it imposes unpleasant restraints because of criminal conduct. See supra notes 123-26, 137-39
& 197-99 and accompanying text. Thus, an inquiry into the reasonableness of the confine-
ment in relation to its nonpunitive purposes is appropriate. Under this inquiry, the confine-
ment would clearly be excessive in cases in which the burglars were rehabilitated prior to
the expiration of the six month period of confinement.
254. An equal protection violation also may be present. For a discussion of the appli-
cability of the equal protection clause to similar situations, see Rosenberg, supra note 191,
at 712-13.
255. See infra notes 256-63 and accompanying text.
256. 93 Misc. 2d 369, 402 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Faro. Ct. 1978).
257. Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976, ch. 878 (codified at N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT. §§
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statute "juvenile proceedings," the New York State Legislature im-
posed fixed periods of confinement, either for six month or twelve
month intervals, for juveniles who commit certain enumerated of-
fenses and who were found to be in need of restrictive place-
ment.2 8 The Felder court analyzed the confinement issue by utiliz-
ing the punishment/therapy distinction. The court cited McKeiver
and concluded that there is no requirement of jury trials in juve-
nile proceedings in which the disposition is "rehabilitative and
nonpenal.'259 "When, however,.., what is actually a punishment
is characterized as a treatment, an abuse of constitutional dimen-
sion has occurred, and, a jury trial is required before punishment,
although appropriate, may be inflicted. 2860 Without relying directly
upon the Supreme Court's cases defining punishment, the Felder
court found that the New York provisions were punitive because
they premised the length of confinement upon "the act committed
rather than [upon] the needs of the child. 2 61 Moreover, the court
found the mandatory nature of the confinement to be inconsistent
with the "philosophy of treatment," which requires that juveniles
be released when rehabilitation occurs.2 62 "Indeterminate sentenc-
ing is based upon notions of rehabilitation, while determinate sen-
tencing is based upon a desire for retribution or punishment. 26 3
This analysis by the Felder court closely reflects the concept of
punishment developed earlier in this Article.2
The concept of punishment may be helpful in analyzing the
sixth amendment consequences of fixed confinement statutes such
as those discussed in J.K. and Felder, but a punishment theory is
also useful in less blantantly punitive contexts. Indeed, whenever
the state imposes "suspiciously punitive" 265 restraints preceded by
criminal conduct, the court should scrutinize the sanction under
the Wolfish excessiveness test.2 6 The result of this scrutiny may
711-67 (Consol. 1977)).
258. 93 Misc. 2d at 376, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 532. The statute in Felder differed somewhat
from that in J.K. The confinement in Felder was not mandatory, but was discretionary with
the court. Id. The period of confinement, however, was fixed by the statute, once the court
determined that confinement was appropriate. J.K., on the other hand, dealt with a statute
that imposed both mandatory and fixed confinement. See supra note 243.
259. 93 Misc. 2d at 374-75, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
260. Id. at 375, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
261. Id. at 376, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
262. Id. at 377, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
263. Id.
264. See supra notes 34-177 and accompanying text.




reveal wholesale inflictions of punishment within the juvenile jus-
tice system.
B. "Status Offenders" and the Applicability of Gault
In addition to fixed confinement delinquency cases, the con-
cept of punishment may play a significant role in assessing the
rights of status offenders. Status offenses include noncriminal juve-
nile misbehavior that is handled through the juvenile justice sys-
tem.87 Sometimes the attention to status relates to conditions and
states of being. For example, juvenile courts often have jurisdiction
over "incorrigible" children26 or those children "who, by reason of
being wayward or habitually disobedient, [are] uncontrolled by
* . .parent[s], guardian[s], or custodian[s]." 9 In other instances,
however, status offenses describe conduct that is proscribed for
children but not for adults such as disobeying curfew or school at-
tendance rules.2 70 Status offenses in either the pure status or con-
duct form often are included with criminal offenses in the defini-
tion of delinquency.27 1 In these situations, often no attempt is
made to differentiate the dispositions of status delinquents from
those of criminal delinquents. 72 Some states, however, segregate
status offenders from nonstatus delinquents and place them in less
restrictive confinements. 7 3 Many recent statutory provisions fur-
ther distinguish status offenders from delinquent offenders who
commit offenses that would be criminal if committed by adults. 4
Under these schemes, status offenders often are called "persons in
need of supervision" (PINS).27 5 The restraints on PINS children
are characteristically less severe than those on "delinquents.
2 7 6
Because the scope of Gault is uncertain outside the context of
delinquency adjudications based on conduct of a criminal na-
ture, 7 the courts have encountered difficulty in assessing the
rights of status offenders. The concept of punishment is helpful in
resolving these difficulties. The Gault protections have been con-
267. See S. Fox, supra note 202, at 39-40.
268. See S. DAvis, RIGHTS OF JUVEN LES (2d ed. 1980).
269. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-247(3) (Supp. 1980).
270. See S. Fox, MODERN JUVENE JUSTICE 512-17 (2d ed. 1981).
271. See S. DAviS, supra note 268, at 6-13.
272. See id.
273. See In re Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973).
274. See, e.g., 29A N.Y. JuD. LAw § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1976-80).
275. See S. Fox, supra note 202, at 40.
276. See S. DAvis, supra note 268, at 6-7.
277. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
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stricted unnecessarily by judicial insensitivity to the relationship
between punishment and status offenses. For example, the Mary-
land Court of Appeals in In re Spalding7 8 limited Gault to situa-
tions in which the juvenile is "charged with an act which ...
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. '2 7' Noncrimi-
nal adjudications such as those conducted in Maryland against
juveniles "who [have] committed ... offense[s] applicable only to
children" were untouched by the Gault line of cases, even though
confinement in a state institution is a possible consequence of be-
ing found guilty of these offenses.28 Indeed, the Spalding court
saw no need to address the constitutional implications of restrict-
ing juvenile liberty in cases where criminal conduct is absent.
[W]e need not decide whether the second prong of the Gault test, i.e., poten-
tial confinement of the child to a state institution, mandated an application
of the privilege against self-incrimination in this case. We reach this conclu-
sion because, in any event, we think that appellant was not charged in this
proceeding with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult." '
This interpretation assumes that the Gault protections are pre-
mised on the concept of criminality. If, however, the earlier analy-
sis in this Article is correct, punishment, with its attendant stigma
and restriction of liberty, is the proper analytical standard.2 s The
concept of punishment defines criminality and not vice versa.
288
Punishment is a concept more extensive than criminality and may
exist in a variety of noncriminal settings.2" Therefore, a proper
reading of Gault should not limit the case to delinquency actions
triggered by "criminal" conduct.
Hence, the Gault protections should not be excluded from sta-
tus offense adjudications, especially those which entail conduct as
opposed to pure status determinations.288 Dispositions in these
cases could entail punishment because the state often imposes un-
pleasant restraints upon youthful offenders who are guilty of mis-
278. 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975).
279. Id. at 709, 332 A.2d at 257. Spalding concerned a delinquency action that was
initiated against a minor but later dropped in favor of a PINS (also called CINS-children
in need of supervision) proceeding when it was discovered that the minor was the victim of a
series of sexual perversions rather than a culpable actor in the affairs.
280. Id. at 698-99, 713, 332 A.2d at 251, 259 (dissenting opinion).
281. 273 Md. at 708, 332 A.2d at 256.
282. See supra notes 183-85, 189-93, 207-16 & 229-35 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 5. But see supra note 27 (problems with generating the concept of
"criminality" from the concept of "punishment").
284. See, e.g., supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
285. See infra text accompanying notes 295-96 & 301-02.
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conduct. Because punishment is the traditional response to crimi-
nal conduct, a court may have more difficulty in discovering
punitive intent in the status cases than in cases such as J.K. and
Felder that, because they were based upon criminal conduct, are
likely to reflect "punishment on their face" under Wolfish.2 6 Puni-
tive intent, however, may be readily apparent in some status cases.
But even if a court has difficulty discerning punitive intent, severe
restrictions of liberty in status cases may still look "suspiciously
like punishment" and thereby trigger the Wolfish excessiveness
test.28 7 Precluding these inquiries altogether by Spalding's wooden
reading of Gault seems clearly unsound.
Apart from conceptual niceties, policy reasons dictate an ex-
tension of Gault to status offense adjudications in which conduct
of a noncriminal nature is at issue. Significant liberty interests
turn on the finding of specific facts. To the extent that Gault and
its progeny express an interest in protecting the fairness and integ-
rity of judicial factfinding, that same interest exists in status of-
fense cases. In both status and criminal offenses, the state has ac-
cused a juvenile of misconduct and has assumed an adversarial
position in relation to the juvenile. Hence, the Gault protections
are equally applicable to both contexts. Moreover, little likelihood
exists that the juvenile justice system's goal of rehabilitation-to
the extent that it actually is attainable- would be sacrificed by
extending the Gault protections6 8 to noncriminal misconduct.28 '
The relationship between the concept of punishment and sta-
tus adjudications that are not premised on particular actions or
conduct presents a more difficult problem. Some courts have ap-
plied the concept of punishment to these pure status cases. For
286. See supra notes 123-26 & 137-40 and accompanying text.
287. See id.
288. Whether the Gault protections should be extended to pre or postadjudication
stages is a problem not addressed in this Article.
289. The rehabilitative value of due process protections at delinquency adjucications
was noted by the Gault Court
[R]ecent studies. . . suggest that the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness,
impartiality and orderliness-in short, the essentials of due process-may be a more
impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is concerned. For exam-
ple, in a recent study ... sociologist[s] . . .observe that when procedural laxness of
the "parens patriae" attitude is followed by stem disciplining, the contrast may have
an adverse effect upon the child, who feels that he has been deceived or enticed. They
conclude as follows: "Unless appropriate due process of law is followed, even the juve-
nile who has violated the law may not feel that he is being fairly treated and may
therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court personnel."
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967); see also Paulsen, supra note 4, at 186.
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example, the district court in Gesicki v. Oswald29 0 held that incar-
ceration in adult penal institutions of "wayward minors" found to
be "morally depraved or in danger of becoming morally depraved"
constituted punishment for a status contrary to Robinson v. Cali-
fornia.9 1 The soundness of the Gesicki result, however, is ques-
tionable because of the court's failure to establish that the disposi-
tion was in fact punitive. The court made no attempt to establish
punitive intent and failed to scrutinize the actual conditions within
the penal institution. In fact, the court intimated that even if the
juveniles were receiving meaningful rehabilitation, their confine-
ment would still be punitive.
[1]t is not an acceptable answer to say that some minors . . .are in fact
treated appropriately for medical, psychological, or social disorders. Such in-
stances of effective treatment, if they exist, would fail to distinguish the Way-
ward Minor statute from criminal legislation generally. It is safe to say that
few if any prison administrators today would describe the function of the
institutions they direct as entirely punitive, and most would undoubtedly cite"rehabilitation" or the equivalent as their most important goal.1"
Thus, the Gesicki court seemed content to equate imprisonment
with punishment regardless of whether rehabilitation actually oc-
curred within the prison. The Gesicki court's analysis is suspect in
light of Wolfish, which implied that a single jailhouse may be si-
multaneously a place of punishment for convicted offenders and a
center of nonpunitive detention for pretrial detainees.2 3 Assess-
ments of punitive intent are necessary to distinguish the jail's pun-
ishment from its preventive detention.2 "
More problems arise upon examination of the meaning of
"punishing a status." The definition of punishment is linked to the
occurance of an offense," 5 but this factor is not present when the
state imposes restraints in response to status conditions. Thus,
punishment of a status appears logically impossible.29'6 Neverthe-
less, Robinson clearly holds that punishing status is possible and
290. 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), afl'd mem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972).
291. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 913-a(5), -a(6) (McKinney 1976). The court also found the
language quoted in the text to be an "unconstitutionally vague penal law" in violation of
due process. 336 F. Supp. at 377, 379.
292. 336 F. Supp. at 378.
293. Pretrial detainees are often housed in the same jails that house convicted offend-
ers. See supra text accompanying note 138. There is nothing in Wolfish to call this practice
into constitutional question so long as the restraints of the pretrial detainees are not unrea-
sonable in light of the interests in assuring their presence at trial.
294. See supra notes 34-154 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 62-64, 148-50 & 152-56 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 148.
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unconstitutional whenever it occurs.297 Therefore, the Gesicki re-
sult may be sound if punishment actually was administered. Wolf-
ish itself provides an avenue for finding punishment in cases like
Gesicki in which juveniles are housed in adult prisons. Because
such facilities are the most vivid symbols of punishment in modern
societyss confinement within them may well evidence punishment
on its face under Wolfish-even though the incarceration is a re-
sponse to a status condition rather than to specific acts of miscon-
duct.29 Wolfish would then require judicial scrutiny of the actual
conditions of confinement in terms of their relationship to
nonpunitive purposes. If the court found the confinement to be ex-
cessive in light of the nonpunitive purpose, the confinement would
properly be labeled punitives e and, hence unconstitutional under
Robinson.
Because of the conceptual anomalies inherent to an analysis of
status confinements in terms of the concept of punishment,30'
soundly reasoned opinions on the punishment of status offenders
will probably rarely appear. Nevertheless, courts may rely upon a
variety of due process and equal protection doctrines to utilize as
alternatives to punishment when assessing the constitutionality of
juvenile confinements of the pure status variety.
302
C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment of Nonstatus Offenders
Although some status offense cases are not easily analyzed
through the concept of punishment, eighth amendment analysis of
nonstatus offense cases is less difficult. Indeed, because of current
297. See id.
298. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 27, at ill. "[I]mprisonment in modern times has
taken on the symbolism of public reprobation. 'It is ... imprisonment in a penitentiary,
which now renders a crime infamous."' Id. (quoting United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S.
433, 447-48 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
299. Wolfish intimates that excessive restraints may be "punitive" when imposed
upon pretrial detainees, who are preventively detained because of their "status" as likely
absconders from trial. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979); supra text accom-
panying note 141.
300. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979).
301. See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
302. A substantive due process "right to treatment" may provide an additional basis,
see generally supra notes 130-35 & 309 and accompanying text, for scrutinizing conditions
of confinement imposed upon juvenile status offenders. See Developments, supra note 128,
at 1324-44. The right to treatment has become well established within the juvenile justice
system. See, e.g., S. Fox, supra note 202, at 228-34. Procedural protections for pure status
offenders may be required by fundamental fairness under due process. See supra notes 180-
88 and accompanying text. This Article does not consider the constitutional necessity for, or
the desirability of, extending the Gault protections to pure status proceedings.
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suspicions of nontreatment and mistreatment of youthful offenders
within the juvenile justice system3 0 8 the ban on cruel and unusual
punishment is an especially appropriate vehicle to protect consti-
tutional interests. Unfortunately, however, as discussed earlier,3
judicial failure to employ carefully a proper concept of punishment
in eighth amendment juvenile jurisprudence often has frustrated
sound analysis. Some courts simply have assumed, without ques-
tion, that the eighth amendment is inapplicable to juvenile disposi-
tions, which the courts perceive to be nonpunitive by definition.30 5
Fortunately, these cases are in the minority. More often, courts
recognize the applicability of the eighth amendment, but usually
determine whether a given juvenile disposition is cruel and unusual
without first showing whether the disposition constitutes punish-
ment. Because the juvenile system is a hybrid that is comprised of
both punitive and therapeutic aspects, a court is remiss when it
fails to analyze the question whether punishment exists. Other
courts have made attempts to establish the punitive nature of a
given disposition, but employ inappropriate definitions of punish-
ment in their analysis. Utilizing the effect theory of punishment,
these courts have generated a body of cases inconsistent with the
Supreme Court conception of punishment."os Nelson v. Heynes0 7 is
303. See supra text accompanying note 195. But see infra note 305.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 236-40.
305. See, e.g., R.R. v. State, 448 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Rios v. Texas, 400 U.S. 808 (1970).
Appellant... takes the position that the confinement of a delinquent child must be
viewed as 'punishment' for the purpose of determining the child's rights under the
Eighth Amendment, even though the language of our juvenile statutes speaks in terms
of treatment rather than punishment.
The record before us contains no evidence concerning the conditions at the state
training schools.... In the absence of evidence that the dismal picture painted in
Gault reflects the conditions in the institutions of this State, and giving due considera-
tion to the legislative declaration of policy and purpose, 'we are not prepared to con-
demn out of hand ... the people working in this field.'
Id. at 189-90.
306. The question arises whether the eighth amendment applies at all to juvenile dis-
positions. The Supreme Court in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), held that the
cruel and unusual punishment clause was inapplicable in the context of public school pun-
ishments. The Court found that an eighth amendment remedy for school children was un-
necessary because schools are traditionally "open" institutions, visible to public scrutiny,
and, therefore, are able to avoid improper punishments either through self-policing or
through public pressure. Id. at 670. The Court noted that unduly severe punishment within
the contexts of penal incarceration would trigger eighth amendment protection. Id. at 669.
Moreover, the Court specifically left open the possible applicability of the eighth amend-
ment to involuntarily confined juveniles. Id. at 669 n.37.
This Article assumes that juvenile dispositions, at least within state institutions, more
closely resemble incarceration settings than they do open schools. Gault also operates under
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a vivid example. In Nelson, the Seventh Circuit considered the
constitutionality of two practices prevalent within the Indiana
Boy's School: corporal punishment inflicted with a "fraternity pad-
dle '3 0 8 and the intramuscular injections of tranquilizing drugs. The
court condemned both practices under the eighth amendment.
Furthermore, the court held that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment guarantees a "right to treatment" for
juveniles committed to state institutions.30 9
The analysis of the tranquilizer issue in Nelson is of particular
interest. The court found that drugs were occasionally adminis-
tered to control the excited behavior of juvenile inmates. Apart
from their effects as sedatives, the drugs possessed no significant
psychotherapeutic benefits.3 10 Moreover, the drugs were capable of
causing severe and dangerous side effects unless carefully moni-
tored by trained medical personnel.3 1  The court found that medi-
cal personnel did not monitor the administration of these drugs. At
no time prior to or following the injections did medical profession-
als examine the youths to determine their individual tolerances for
the drugs. Instead, the school administered standardized dosages
pursuant to orders given by the school's only physician.1 " The
Nelson court summarily rejected the school's claim that the use of
the drugs did not constitute punishment.3 1 3 Without mentioning
punitive intent or attempting to establish the absence of therapeu-
tic motivation,1 the court found the injections to be cruel and un-
usual punishment simply because of the dangers inherent in mis-
use of the drugs. The court, however, suggested that the injections
this assumption. See supra text accompanying note 195.
For a discussion of Ingraham, see Rosenberg, Ingraham v. Wright: The Supreme
Court's Whipping Boy, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 75 (1978).
307. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
308. As punishment for various offenses against institutional rules, juveniles were
beaten with a paddle between one-half and two inches thick and twelve inches long, with a
narrow handle. The beatings were apparently ungoverned by extensive formal procedures
and sometimes caused painful injuries. Id. at 354.
309. Id. at 358-60.
310. Id. at 356.
311. Id. at 357. The court found that the drugs could cause "the collapse of the cardio-
vascular system, the closing of a patient's throat with consequent asphyxiation, a depressant
effect on the production of bone marrow, jaundice from an affected liver, and drowsiness,
hemotological disorders, sore throat and ocular changes." Id. (footnote omitted).
312. Id. at 354, 356.
313. "We are not persuaded by defendants' argument that the use of tranquilizing
drugs is not 'punishment."' Id. at 357.
314. The court recognized that the drugs were not administered "as part of an ongoing
psychotherapeutic program but for the purpose of controlling excited behavior." Id. at 356.
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may have been permissible if they had been administered more
carefully.
3 15
The Nelson court's definition of punishment appears to hinge
on the objective quality of the medical care that is provided. If the
care is reasonably safe, no punishment, or at least no cruel punish-
ment, exists. If, on the other hand, the care creates unreasonable
risks, it is punitive and violative of the eighth amendment. The
Nelson approach is surely at odds with the Supreme Court's con-
cept of punishment. Indeed, a few years after Nelson, the Court
specifically rejected a medical malpractice conception of punish-
ment similar to that espoused in Nelson. The Court said that only
"deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of inmates"
could constitute punishment proscribed by the eighth amend-
ment." ' Punishment cannot be defined simply in terms of unpleas-
ant effects upon the allegedly punished persons, no matter how
threatening or unpleasant those effects might be. The effects must
be caused purposely.
If the Nelson court had properly applied the concept of pun-
ishment, it could have prohibited the injections under the eighth
amendment. If the court had found that the injections were ad-
ministered to penalize misconduct by juvenile inmates,3 117 the injec-
tions may have been punitive, especially in light of the physical
pain inflicted by the needle. Like the fraternity paddle, which the
court justifiably held to violate the eighth amendment,318 the nee-
dle could also be viewed as an instrument of punishment, pur-
posely imposed to achieve retributive or deterrent aims. Once
found to be punishment, the injections could then be proscribed
under the eighth amendment if found to be cruel and unusual. On
the other hand, if the court's inquiry into the purpose for the injec-
tions had revealed an intent to relieve undesirable status condi-
315. In detailing the minimum medical safeguards that should be followed in using the
drugs, the court limited its holding to the Nelson facts. "We do not intend that ... reform
institutional physicians cannot prescribe necessary tranquilizing drugs in appropriate cases.
Our concern is with ... potential abuses under policies where ... drugs are administered
to juveniles intramuscularly by staff, without trying medication short of drugs and without
adequate medical guidance and prescription." Id. at 357.
316. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see supra note 132.
317. The court said only that the injections were administered "for the purpose of
controlling excited behavior." 491 F.2d at 352. The court, however, did not state whether
the behavior entailed acts of misconduct by the juveniles. The court cited two examples of
the use of the injections to control behavioral conditions of a morally neutral nature. Id. at
356 n.8 (drug used to control a "hollering juvenile" and to prevent another from escaping
from the school).
318. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
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tions' 19 the injections could be characterized as therapy rather
than as punishment.2 0 The prescription of sedatives to control ex-
cited behavior, even when involuntarily administered, is sometimes
unquestionably a therapeutic action.32 1 But even if the Nelson
court had found the injections to constitute therapy and not pun-
ishment, the court should not have allowed the drugs, with their
attendant dangers, to be administered. Indeed, Nelson's own right
to treatment theory would have prohibited the injections as unrea-
sonably risky 2 2 as would more general due process doctrines that
protect a person from unreasonable or dangerous applications of
state force.32 3 If the Nelson court could not find the injections to
be punitive under the proper definition of punishment, then the
court should not have forced the case into an eighth amendment
framework,3 2' and thus distort the concept of punishment and re-
strict its analytical effectiveness.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has suggested that Justice Stewart's focus upon
the concept of punishment-as distinct from the notion of ther-
apy-is a useful and sometimes necessary analytical approach to
assess juvenile rights, which exist in a system that commingles pu-
nitive and therapeutic considerations. The punishment approach
has to date been sporadically and ineffectively employed, in part
because courts have had difficulty in formulating workable defin-
tions of punishment and therapy. The conceptual framework sug-
gested in this Article is proposed to lessen these difficulties. In
light of the illustrative cases discussed, the concepts of punishment
319. See supra note 317 for evidence that the drugs were used to relieve status condi-
tions rather than to punish acts of misconduct.
320. See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text. For a case similar to Nelson that
struggles with the punishment/therapy distinction, see Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136
(8th Cir. 1973) (administration of drug that induces vomiting as "adversive stimuli" treat-
ment of mental institution inmate for allegedly violating behavior rule of institution consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment unless inmate consents to use of the drug).
321. See supra note 315.
322. "[T]he 'right to treatment' includes the right to minimum acceptable standards
of care and treatment." 491 F.2d at 360; see supra note 315.
323. See supra note 168; see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (involunta-
rily pumping a suspect's stomach violates due process); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,
1032 (2d Cir. 1973) (although not punishment, application of undue force by the state
against a criminal suspect deprives him of liberty without due process of law).
324. One commentator has criticized the Nelson court's eighth amendment analysis:
"It is clear that ... the panel of the Seventh Circuit were more sure of their desire to stop
the particular practice at issue than they were of the analytical basis for such a prohibition."
60 Va. L. Rev. 864, 871 (1974).
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and therapy here derived appear useful in promoting analysis of
juvenile problems without abandoning established Supreme Court
doctrine. If the Court's future analysis remains true to this doc-
trine, then a host of other juvenile rights issues may await illumi-
nation through the concept of punishment.

